What Doha delivered: Diplomacy beyond the podium

The Doha summit stands as a potent act of collective diplomacy

When Qatar hosted the Arab-Islamic emergency summit on 15 September 2025—just days after an Israeli strike in Doha killed Hamas leaders and a Qatari officer—expectations were high. Could this gathering produce more than a chorus of protest speeches? Would it reshape regional alignments, force policy shifts, or deepen legal and military responses? As the dust settles, Doha emerges as a significant diplomatic moment that combined high symbolism with cautious substance.1

Participation and presence

The first measure of success lay in the breadth of participation. Qatar secured an impressive roster of leaders from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.2 Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif all arrived in person.3 For Qatar, whose sovereignty had been directly violated, such high-level attendance signalled a powerful endorsement of its grievance and a clear message of regional solidarity.

Equally significant was the presence of countries that maintain formal ties with Israel. Senior delegations from the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco—states that had joined the Abraham Accords—added weight to the gathering.4 Their decision to endorse a communiqué critical of Israel and to consider a “review of diplomatic and economic ties” reflected a subtle but important shift in the regional conversation. By convening the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in tandem with the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Supreme Council, Qatar ensured that the summit carried institutional legitimacy beyond a one-off protest meeting.5

The optics were unmistakable. The group photograph of leaders standing together in Doha conveyed a rare moment of unity, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Qatar after years of rivalry. Yet presence alone does not guarantee policy coherence. States arrived with different red lines and threat perceptions, and those differences inevitably shaped the final text.

The Doha communiqué

The summit’s outcome document is the clearest indicator of what this diplomacy achieved. It opens with an unequivocal denunciation of the Israeli strike as a “flagrant” violation of Qatari sovereignty and the United Nations Charter, pledging “absolute solidarity” with Doha.6 This framing elevates the incident from a dispute involving a non-state actor to a direct breach of state sovereignty—precisely the legal terrain on which international action can be built.

The communiqué also calls for “all possible legal and effective measures” against Israel, including a review of diplomatic and economic relations and support for international legal proceedings.7 The accompanying GCC statement goes further, directing the bloc’s Unified Military Command to activate joint defence and deterrence mechanisms—language rarely used in recent years and potentially the summit’s most concrete step.8

At the same time, the document bears the marks of compromise. It contains no binding sanctions, no timelines and no collective commitment to sever ties or impose economic penalties.9 References to a political horizon and a two-state solution were retained only after careful wording, and Iran publicly distanced itself from those passages.10 Implementation remains undefined; the language provides flexibility rather than obligation.

Diplomatic gains

Despite these limits, the Doha summit produced notable achievements. For Qatar, the gathering reinforced its sovereignty claim and insulated it from isolation, ensuring that any further action—legal or diplomatic—carries broad regional backing.11 For the wider Arab and Islamic world, it expanded diplomatic space. States that balance relations with Israel and the West can now point to a region-wide mandate if they choose to recalibrate their positions.

The emphasis on international law was not mere rhetoric. By explicitly endorsing legal action, the summit placed Israel’s actions under a sharper legal spotlight and opened pathways to the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court.12 At the same time, the GCC’s call to enhance joint defence gives the Gulf states a framework for practical coordination, a reminder that collective security is again on the agenda after years of drift.13

New US signals

Events in Washington and Doha shortly after the summit add another layer of significance. During a visit to Qatar following meetings in Israel, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed that Washington had not approved the strike and emphasized the inviolability of Qatari sovereignty.14 Rubio warned that there was only a “very short window” to achieve a Gaza ceasefire and praised Qatar’s role as mediator.15 Most notably, he announced that the United States and Qatar are close to finalising an enhanced defence cooperation agreement, signalling that the US intends to deepen its military partnership with Doha in response to the attack.16

This development underscores that the summit’s impact extended beyond the region. By drawing the United States into closer strategic alignment with Qatar, the Doha gathering has influenced the calculations of the very power whose ally carried out the strike.

A new axis: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

At nearly the same moment, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan concluded a Strategic Defence Agreement pledging that aggression against one would be treated as aggression against both.17 The pact goes beyond symbolism, committing the two states to joint defence planning and deterrence. For Riyadh, it represents a diversification of security partnerships beyond the traditional US umbrella; for Islamabad, it strengthens its role as a Gulf security partner and amplifies its own strategic significance.

The agreement reverberates well beyond the Doha summit’s walls. By binding the region’s largest Arab economy to South Asia’s only nuclear-armed state, it raises the cost of any future violation of Gulf sovereignty and points toward a more multipolar security architecture in the broader Middle East.

Limitations and risks

Still, the limitations are clear. Diverging national interests remain the chief obstacle to collective action. Iran’s rejection of two-state language underscores how difficult it will be to maintain unity beyond rhetorical condemnation.18 Many governments are constrained by ties to the United States and Europe, economic interdependence and domestic political considerations.19 For leaders facing their own fragile coalitions, dramatic gestures—severing ties, imposing sanctions—can carry steep internal costs.

The reliance on careful verbs—”review,” “consider,” “possible measures”—exposes the gap between symbolism and enforcement.20 Without timelines, verification or shared mechanisms, momentum may fade and the communiqué may come to be seen as another strong statement without follow-through.

What to watch

The true measure of Doha’s success will unfold in the coming months. Signs to watch include whether the GCC’s Unified Military Command moves beyond declarations into coordinated air-defence or deterrence exercises; whether states that maintain relations with Israel undertake tangible downgrades; whether Qatar or a coalition of Arab states file legal cases before international courts; and whether Washington and Doha translate the promised defence cooperation agreement into operational reality.21 External reactions—including how India, Iran and Israel read the Saudi-Pakistan pact—will further shape the region’s strategic balance.

A turning point or a pause?

The Doha summit stands as a potent act of collective diplomacy. It reaffirmed that the breach of a Gulf state’s sovereignty cannot pass without unified censure and gave Qatar legal and political tools to pursue redress.22 It also signalled that the GCC, long criticised for inertia, is willing at least to contemplate a more robust security posture. The subsequent US moves and the Saudi-Pakistan defence agreement reinforce that this moment is shaping realignments beyond the Gulf.

Yet the ultimate verdict depends on implementation. Without concrete actions—legal filings, defence coordination, or measured economic steps—the communiqués risk becoming another carefully worded protest destined to fade from headlines.23 Doha has provided the language and the platform; it remains to be seen whether the region’s leaders—and now their new partners—will supply the resolve. 

Endnotes:

1Final Communiqué of the Joint Arab League–OIC Extraordinary Summit, Doha, 15 Sept 2025.

2Al Jazeera English, “Arab–Islamic leaders condemn Israeli attack on Doha,” 16 Sept 2025.

3Reuters, “Leaders gather in Doha for emergency summit after Israeli strike,” 16 Sept 2025.

4The Guardian, “Gulf states weigh diplomatic response after Israeli strike in Qatar,” 16 Sept 2025.

5The National (UAE), “GCC pledges joint defence after Doha attack,” 17 Sept 2025.

6United Nations Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51 (sovereignty and self-defence).

7Associated Press, “Summit calls for ‘all possible legal and effective measures’,” 16 Sept 2025.

8GCC Supreme Council Statement on Collective Defence and Deterrence, Doha, 15 Sept 2025.

9Reuters, “Draft communique softened to avoid binding sanctions,” 17 Sept 2025.

10AP, “Iran rejects two-state reference in Doha summit declaration,” 17 Sept 2025.

11Al Jazeera, “Qatar finds regional shield after attack,” 17 Sept 2025.

12ICJ and ICC statutes on state responsibility and war crimes.

13The National, “GCC defence chiefs plan follow-up meeting in Doha,” 18 Sept 2025.

14Reuters, “U.S. position after Doha strike: sovereignty inviolable,” 17 Sept 2025.

15Associated Press, “Rubio urges swift Gaza ceasefire, praises Qatari mediation,” 17 Sept 2025.

16Reuters, “U.S. and Qatar near enhanced defence cooperation agreement, Rubio says,” 17 Sept 2025.

17AP, “Saudi Arabia, Pakistan sign Strategic Defence Agreement,” 17 Sept 2025.

18AP, “Iran rejects two-state reference,” 17 Sept 2025.

19Reuters, “U.S. warns Gulf states over escalation,” 18 Sept 2025.

20Guardian analysis, “Summit language shows limits of unity,” 18 Sept 2025.

21Doha News, “Qatar FM outlines potential ICJ filing,” 19 Sept 2025.

22Final Communiqué, Arab League–OIC Summit, Doha, 15 Sept 2025.

23Guardian analysis, “Words without follow-through?” 19 Sept 2025.

(The writer is former Ambassador of Sri Lanka to EU, Belgium, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.)