Effective representation eludes Sri Lanka’s minorities

Minorities voting in Sri Lanka

Minority parties pursue different strategies to manage tensions with the dominant political structure. Some choose to contest alongside other parties, form alliances, and be part of ruling coalitions, which gives them a role within government, and access to more resources which they can use to help their communities. But there is a downside to this. Even in power, ethnic minority parties face restrictions. They may have to support the Government’s anti-minorities policies   

Sri Lanka’s minority Tamils, Muslims and Malaiyaga Tamils, are groping in the dark for meaningful participation in a socio-political system dominated by the majority Sinhala-Buddhist community. Over the years, these communities have experimented with various strategies in a bid to be heard and accommodated in the overall political system. But effective representation has continued to elude them, says a report done by researchers from the Minority Rights Group and Oxford Brookes University led Dr. Farah Mihlar.

This is so especially in the case of the North-Eastern Tamils. The Muslims and Malaiyaga Tamils, on the other hand, have had greater success, having been more flexible and creative in their dealings with the system.

But all minorities labour against heavy odds whether their parties are in the government or the opposition, the report entitled “Divided and Weakened: The Collapse of Minority Politics in Sri Lanka” says.

As the North-Eastern Tamils tend to pitch for federalism, when federalism is anathema for the Sinhalese majority, a sense of disappointment is palpable and widespread among them. The Muslims and Malayaga Tamils also have issues with the dominant community, but unlike the Sri Lankan Tamils, they have not been hostage to a single goal and are therefore not in constant confrontation with the majority community. They cooperate with or confront the dominant community depending upon issues.

“The minority politics that has existed in Sri Lanka since independence is disintegrating, on the one hand crushed by structural majoritarian nationalism, and on the other stunted by a lack of vision, identity and leadership within minorities’ own political parties,” Dr. Mihlar says.

The study quotes a former Tamil militant who gave up arms in 1989 to become an elected Member of Parliament (MP), as saying; “No one gained by it, not a single MP has achieved anything. We have no other solution, we have no option, we have to do this politics.”

Representatives elected to parliament from ethnic minority parties say that, since independence, majoritarian nationalism, functioning through State organs such as the military and civil service, has limited their effectiveness. Extremist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism rose within the government particularly under the Presidencies of Mahinda Rajapaksa (2005-2015) and his brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa (2019-2022).

“Their terms in office are seen as especially suffocating for minorities, whose political representatives were restrained from serving their communities at different levels. This included a number of different strategies ranging from allegedly buying out minority MPs and sowing division in ethnic minority parties, to completely curtailing these parties from acting in the interest of the communities they represent,” Dr. Mihlar says.

As the Rajapaksas rode the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist wave, candidates opposing them (the Opposition parties) often had the guaranteed support of minority voters. But to wash off the stain of having minority support, the Opposition parties refrain from openly taking pro-minority positions.

At best, the national parties would offer the “lowest common denominator” like the effective implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution or verbal guarantees of equality. At any rate, no candidate would publicly commit to pursuing accountability for wartime atrocities or pledge a political resolution to the ethnic conflict. Comprehensively addressing minority rights or grievances has become a rare feature of the agendas of Sri Lankan national parties, Dr. Mihlar points out.

Alliance politics

National political parties with a history of fielding minority candidates now form alliances and coalitions with ethnic minority parties. But at the same time, they offer less space inside their own parties for both minority representatives and minority issues, Dr. Mihlar says. Therefore, being inside a national party has not necessarily served minority interests.

Minority parties splinter

Parties of all three minority communities have splintered into several factions, partly as a result of manipulations by the major national parties, Dr. Mihlar says.

In addition, extremist positions espoused by some groups belonging to minorities have also contributed to splintering, she adds. For example, the most prominent Tamil party, Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), has struggled to define its political path, given the prevalence of Tamil ultra-nationalism in the areas formerly affected by the civil war.

Muslim parties and those of the Malaiyaga Tamil community also present a picture of disarray, division and lost credibility. “These parties have erratically switched allegiances with nationalist mainstream parties trying to capitalise on shifting alliances and coalition formation, which eventually damaged them deeply. Their own lack of openness to new leadership and progressive reforms, amidst allegations of corruption, have not helped their cause.”

The strategic undermining of minority political actors and the dwindling returns of representation have together starved minority politics, leaving minority ethnic and religious communities with little in terms of political solutions to their grievances, Dr. Mihlar contends.

Different strategies

Minority parties pursue different strategies to manage tensions with the dominant political structure. Some choose to contest alongside other parties, form alliances, and be part of ruling coalitions, which gives them a role within government, and access to more resources which they can use to help their communities. But there is a downside to this. Even in power, ethnic minority parties face restrictions. They may have to support the Government’s anti-minorities policies.

As for those who are in the opposition, “they are often made to fail, particularly in the North and East where military occupation continues, and violations of minority rights are high.”

Nearly every one of the former opposition MPs from Tamil parties in the north who were interviewed, explained that at best they are merely preventing the worst from taking place, which raises serious questions regarding the value of electoral representation for them.

Role of State apparatus

The nexus between ethnic and religious nationalists and the country’s security forces and the bureaucracy plays a major role in limiting political representation in minority areas. “This is done through various means that include failing to protect communities and preventing minority political representatives from working in their areas,” the report points out.

Tamil and Muslim politicians presented numerous examples of how the State colludes with nationalist forces in projects to take over minority lands by planting Buddhist relics in their territories and claiming the locations as religious sites of archaeological importance.

In such instances, which occur routinely in the north and east, security forces often protect Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist forces and support them whilst restricting the access of and investigations by minority political actors, the report alleges.

“The bureaucracy makes it difficult to push forward policies that focus on minority communities, thus nullifying the value of minority parties being represented in the government. Government officials may listen and give promises, but when it comes to implementation it is very very slow, worse than a snail,” said a source.

“Even minority community political representatives holding ministerial positions in sectors such as education, land and housing face challenges in securing adequate budget allocations for their communities,” an MP from the Malaiyaga Tamil community said.

Language barrier

Language is a significant problem for minority politicians as the state sector, especially as organs of the central government function largely in the Sinhala language. Minority politicians who make it to cabinet posts have to be able to communicate at some level in Sinhalese, especially with administrators such as ministry secretaries. This also extends to communication with heads of state, all of whom have so far been Sinhalese. Moreover, the main national political parties also function almost entirely in Sinhalese.

Tamil nationalism as a divider

The nature of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism is part of the problem. It has led to most Tamil parties remaining in the opposition. Moderate Tamil political parties such as the ITAK struggle to distance themselves from Tamil ultranationalist positions.

But the electorate appears to be getting fluid in its support, as indicated by the election of non-nationalist Tamil candidates in 2020 and 2024.

Impact of Muslim extremism

Muslim extremism is incipient but it has worsened the Muslims’ position in Sri Lanka. The Easter Sunday bombings in 2019 that were carried out by nine Muslim suicide bombers in Christian churches and hotels in Colombo unearthed the presence of Islamic violent extremism in Sri Lanka. Muslim community activists had warned the country’s security establishment of this trend, but their warnings had gone unheeded. However, Muslims across the country paid a massive toll for the attacks as the Government arbitrarily arrested hundreds under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Following the attacks, Buddhist extremist groups, with State support, went on a rampage in different parts of the country attacking Muslim neighbourhoods and places of worship. The Buddhist monk and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist politician Athuraliye Rathana Thero embarked upon a fast unto death, calling for the resignation of two Muslim governors and one minister for their alleged involvement in the attacks. Within days, large groups of Buddhists began demonstrations in the Central Province capital Kandy by the Dalada Maligawa, demanding that the Government issue an ultimatum for the resignations.

“Though the longer-term effects of Islamic violent extremism on Muslim politics are yet to be seen, its immediate impact on national politics was notable in that it contributed to the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2019. The Islamic extremism card is frequently played by Buddhist extremist groups during elections. Many Muslim political figures have been tarred by hate campaigns online,” Dr. Mihlar points out.

Then there are tensions between Muslims and Tamils in the east which originated from a Tamil militant perception of the development of Muslim politics as antithetical to their separatist struggle. This is complicated by disputes over for land.

Muslims in national parties

The established national political parties and their associated fronts had fielded Muslims. But there has been a change in this. In the 2020 election, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s SLPP did not field a single minority candidate in the minority-populous Colombo district.

Minority MPs who contested elections from within the national parties say that opportunities for them are diminishing, as these parties now prefer to form coalitions with ethnic minority parties. By making these coalitions, national parties can secure a block of votes from the minority community, for supporting one or two of their demands in return. Consequently, national parties do not feel the need to consider the political representation of minority communities, as they can achieve their goals through these strategic alliances.

NPP factor

The National People’s Power (NPP) transformed the country’s political landscape in 2024. The 2024 Parliamentary election saw 18 minority MPs elected through the NPP from several districts across the country, including Jaffna and the Vanni. The NPP brought in seven Muslim MPs out of a total of 18.

Dr. Rizvie Salih, the NPP’s only Muslim MP in Colombo and Deputy Speaker of Parliament explains how the party won the Muslim vote: “Muslims were let down by the other two main parties, they were ostracised, they were being used, they didn’t benefit in any way. Muslim parties were already condemned by our people, what did they do all these years when anti-Muslim sentiments arose? They were unable to use the votes they got to help people. It is time we put an end to “political sparring” and get together to rebuild this nation. This is clearly what the electorate wants.”

“For 76 years the Tamil people were cheated and defeated again and again, people were fed up with those things. We don’t want to make this country worse and worse and the NPP has a leftist position, which is generally quite popular in the north,” Rajeevan Jeyachandramoorthy, a newly elected NPP MP for Jaffna said.

Jayachandramoorthy added that the NPP campaigned on a strong equality and non-discrimination agenda and, at various political meetings, leaders of the party had also given guarantees of pursuing justice for wartime atrocities. 

The shift in allegiance of north-eastern voters to the NPP in both the presidential and parliamentary elections suggests that they wanted to join this wave of change sweeping the country. It is another matter that the NPP is yet to address the basic issues agitating the Tamils.

Why ethnic parties?

The study examines the questions: Do ethnic minority parties serve a purpose for their communities or can minorities achieve the same or more by being represented within mainstream parties? Can ethnic minority parties achieve more for their electorates through gaining executive powers?

The main parties within each ethnic group have strong reasons for their existence. With regard to the Sri Lankan Tamils, the divergence between Sinhala nationalism and Tamil nationalism is seen to be too wide for group needs to be met through the mainstream parties.

The unique challenges faced by Malaiyaga Tamils, especially in the 1960s when they were stateless, also required a distinct political force that could advocate their needs, which were different to the Sri Lankan Tamils. Hence, the formation of the CWC.

In the case of Muslims, the issue is more complex. Their justification as ethnic minority parties is not necessarily shared by Muslims in Colombo and other southern areas, whose economic and social interests may also align with those of the Sinhala or the Tamil community.

Muslim politicians elected from mainstream national parties have depended on non-Muslim votes to be elected, and their success is seen as important for strengthening minority representation within mainstream politics, rather than through ethnic minority parties.

The counterargument to this is that their dependence on non-Muslim votes and the fervour of national party leadership means they are unable to enhance the position of Muslims in a way that parties like SLMC and ACMC may be able to.

Proponents of Muslim minority parties firmly hold the view that they have achieved far more for the community across the country than those within the mainstream parties have. They explain that as they are elected most often purely on the vote of Muslims, and they take that vote bank to the governing parties, they are able to negotiate for far more direct developmental and other support for their constituents.

Opponents of Muslim party politics explain that these parties have ethnicised political discourse and made the community vulnerable to Sinhala-Buddhist attacks. Representing not just their own community but also other ethnic groups in their locality could have strengthened their position and contributed to greater reconciliation, they argue.

Malayaha Tamil leader S. Thondaman saw virtue in both separateness and collaboration. The CWC ensured identity even as the community gained politically through various coalitions with mainstream national parties. The CWC’s close affiliation with and the support given to former President R. Premadasa resulted in The Grant of Citizenship to Stateless Persons Act of 1988.