From Valvettithurai to Nandhikkadal: Rise and fall of LTTE

Prabhakaran, like a compulsive gambler, risked the entire existence of the Tamil people as a vibrant ethnicity in Sri Lanka for the elusive goal of Tamil Eelam

The evolution and growth of the armed struggle for the goal of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka saw many Tamil militant groups emerge across the politico-military horizon. There was a time when 34 known outfits – big and small – existed. Among all these, the single organisation that kept the Tamil armed struggle alive for many years was none other than the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by Velupillai Prabhakaran from Valvettithurai in the Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE under Prabhakaran fought on relentlessly towards its avowed objective of a separate Tamil State until the very end.

The month of May is significant in the history of the Tamil secessionist armed struggle in Sri Lanka. It was on 5 May 1976, that a section of militant Sri Lankan Tamil youths re-organised themselves into the LTTE with the goal of establishing a separate Tamil State on the Island through an armed struggle. It was on 14 May 1976, that the chief political configuration of the Sri Lankan Tamils re-named itself as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and adopted a resolution demanding the creation of a Tamil State called “Tamil Eelam” comprising the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the Island.

Decades later in May 2009, the LTTE suffered a total military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan armed forces in the Mullaitheevu district of Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. Four days in May from 15 May to 18 May were of crucial importance in this regard. On 19 May 2009, South Asia’s longest war came to an end with the official announcement that the LTTE leader Thiruvengadam Veluppillai Prabhakaran was dead. His body was recovered on the banks of the Mullaitheevu lagoon known as “Nandhikkadal”. The LTTE formed in May 1976 was militarily annihilated after 33 years in May 2009.

It can be seen therefore, that the month of May has proved to be of great significance in the Tamil armed struggle for Tamil Eelam spearheaded by the LTTE known as the Tigers. It is against this backdrop that this column, in this third week of May, focuses on Prabhakaran and the rise and fall of the LTTE with the aid of earlier writings.

Valvettithurai

Prabhakaran was born on 26 November 1954. He was the youngest in a family of two boys and two girls. Since he was the youngest, Prabhakaran’s pet name was “Thambi” or younger brother. His father was Veerasamy Thiruvengadam Veluppillai. Prabhakaran’s mother’s name is Paarvathipillai. Prabhakaran’s family hailed from the coastal town of Valvettithurai, referred to generally as VVT. Prabhakaran’s family was of respected lineage in VVT. They were known as belonging to the “Thirumeni kudumbam” or Thirumeni family. Prabhakaran’s ancestors constructed the famous Sivan Temple of VVT.

Prabhakaran’s attitude and political thinking was shaped by contemporary events and environment. The gruesome tales he heard as a four-year-old child about the 1958 anti-Tamil violence impacted greatly. One day, Prabhakaran’s home had a female visitor whose legs were scarred by burns. Upon inquiring, the little boy was told that the woman’s home had been set on fire by a “Sinhala” mob. She had escaped with burns. Young Praba also heard the famous story of the Brahmin priest in Panadura being burnt to death in a bonfire, and also about the infant thrown into a tar barrel. All these tales made an indelible impression.

Being a native of Valvettithurai was another factor in making a militant out of Prabhakaran. VVT had acquired a reputation for smuggling and had a sub-culture of its own. “Operation Monty” was launched by the armed forces in post-independence Sri Lanka to check and counter illicit immigration and smuggling.

This necessitated the setting up of security camps in VVT from the early fifties of the last century. There was much friction as a result of this military presence. This in turn led to a confrontational mood prevailing between the VVT people and armed forces long before the political crisis escalated in the seventies. It was in this environment that Prabhakaran and a host of other VVT youth grew up in Valvettithurai with anger and resentment towards the armed forces and by extension the Government in Colombo.

Tamil self-rule party

Prabhakaran growing up in this atmosphere got politically motivated in the late sixties and early seventies of the previous century. This was when former Kayts MP V. Navaratnam broke away from the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) known as Federal Party (FP) in English. Navaratnam once described as the “golden brain” of the FP formed the “Thamizhar Suyaatchi Kazhagham” or Tamil self-rule party in 1968.

Navaratnam abandoned the federal demand as being too little and too late and instead opted for “Suyaatchi” or “self-rule” – a euphemism of sorts for a separate State. There was a pedagogue named Venugopal master for whom Prabhakaran had great regard and respect. Venugopal master became an active supporter of Navaratnam. Several students, including Prabhakaran became his followers and turned into ardent devotees of Tamil self-rule.

With the introduction of standardisation in 1970, the student population of Jaffna began getting radicalised. The Tamil Maanavar Peravai (Tamil Students’ Federation) and Tamil Ilaignar Peravai (Tamil Youth Federation) were formed. A series of meetings, processions and rallies were held. Prabhakaran himself began participating in some of these activities and also attended most of the Tamil student and youth activist meetings.

Soon he began losing interest in meetings and non-violent agitation. These were too tame for him. Greatly inspired by tales of Israel’s Hagannah and Irgun, Prabhakaran became firmly convinced that perceived Sri Lankan State oppression could be resisted only through force.

Tamil New Tigers

Prabhakaran teamed up with some others and formed the Tamil New Tigers. Apparently some of the Tamil radicals in the ITAK like Rajaratnam of Nunaavil had formed a group named “Tigers” to fight for Tamil rights in the early sixties. This never got off the ground. Prabhakaran had begun interacting with Rajaratnam and felt the new movement should be a “revival” of sorts. Hence, Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The acronym TNT was also applicable for the explosive compound “Trinitrotoluene”.

The TNT made its mark in July 1975 with the assassination of former Jaffna MP and Mayor Alfred Durayappah at the Ponnaalai Varatharajapperumaal (Vishnu) Temple. Later Prabhakaran went on record that this killing was his “first military action”.

Formation of LTTE

The TNT metamorphosed into the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on 5 May 1976. On that day, around 40-50 Tamil youths met clandestinely at a secret location in the Jaffna peninsula and formed the LTTE. Uma Maheswaran became its leader. Prabhakaran was made Military Commander. A five-member committee was appointed to control and coordinate the new movement. Both Uma Maheswaran and Prabhakaran were members of this committee.

The LTTE split into two after a few years. A large number of members broke away under the leadership of Uma Maheswaran and formed the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). Some like Nagarajah and Aiyer went their own way. Only a handful of the original LTTE members remained loyal to Prabhakaran.

Now the LTTE began functioning independently under Prabhakaran, who was both its Leader and Military Commander. Later Charles Anthony alias Seelan, became Military Chief. By July 1983, the LTTE cadre numbered 30. There were 23 full-time members and seven part-timers and there were also many ‘helpers’ of all ages from different walks of life.

Black July

The LTTE killed 13 soldiers through a landmine at Thirunelvely on 23 July 1983. This triggered off the Black July 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom. There was a spontaneous ‘rush’ by Tamil youths to join the militant movements and fight for Tamil Eelam. India began training and arming the movements. The struggle for Tamil Eelam itself underwent many bizarre twists and peculiar turns. There was internecine warfare among the movements. The LTTE became the dominant Tamil group.

Indo-Lanka Agreement

The Indo-Lanka Agreement of 29 July 1987, caused a sea of change in Tamil politics. Except for the LTTE, all other Tamil parties and organisations accepted the accord. They opted to give up the Tamil Eelam struggle and accept an arrangement provided under the Accord. The LTTE also agreed initially, surrendered some arms, and even accepted a monthly payment of money from New Delhi as an ‘incentive’ in the early stages. The Tigers, however, changed track soon and resumed hostilities, daring to even take on the Indian Army. The Indian army was withdrawn in 1990.

The ensuing years saw many rounds of peace talks between the LTTE and different Governments in Colombo. None of them succeeded and the country suffered endless war interspersed with temporary spells of no war.

“Growth” of LTTE

In the meantime, the LTTE achieved tremendous ‘growth’ in certain aspects. The initial double-digit membership reached five digits. The LTTE developed into a transnational entity with front/branch organisations among the widespread Tamil diaspora. From 1990, the LTTE succeeded in keeping under its control sizeable parts of the north and east. The area of this de facto state fluctuated periodically until the end came in May 2009. Tiger territory has increased and decreased according to the fortunes of war. Yet, there was for many years, a “variable” sphere of LTTE control akin to a de-facto state.

Within this “LTTE–controlled” area, the Tigers set up structures like Police Stations, Courts, Inland Revenue Offices, TV, radio, film units, newspapers, banks, Immigration and Emigration Offices, business ventures, farms, etc., They even drafted their own laws.

Militarily, the LTTE grew. The Tigers raised Infantry Brigades, Women’s Brigades, Commando units and specialised divisions for laying mines, sniping, firing mortars and artillery, resisting tanks and armoured cars, etc. Above all, they had a suicide killer squad known as the Black Tigers or Karumpuligal.

The Tigers also formed a naval wing known as Sea Tigers and a fledgling air wing called Air Tigers. The LTTE possessed many marine vessels and a limited number of small aircraft.

The Tigers set up an elaborate overseas network with the Tamil diaspora as its base. There were multiple media organisations engaging in propaganda and myriad activists raising funds. The Tigers had the capacity to organise mass demonstrations at short notice in many Western cities. The LTTE also ran many commercial enterprises in several countries both West and East. They also ran a fleet of ships transporting arms acquired overseas to the North of Sri Lanka.

In short, the LTTE’s growth in the post-83 era was phenomenal. It was perhaps the only enterprise run ‘for, of and by’ the Tamil people in Sri Lanka that registered a ‘success’ of this magnitude after July 1983.

Inconvenient truth

This successful growth came at a huge cost to the Tamil people of Sri Lanka. Vertically the LTTE went up, but horizontally the Sri Lankan Tamils went down. This was the unpleasant and inconvenient truth that the LTTE and acolytes often denied and did not like to hear being said in the past.

After decades of fighting that debilitated and diminished the Tamil people, no concrete gains were made by the LTTE in winning back the lost rights of the Tamil people. Death, displacement and destruction enveloped the Tamil areas for many years. Despite all this suffering and sorrow undergone by the Tamil people, the LTTE had achieved nothing tangible in its enduring quest for Tamil Eelam.

Writing on the wall

The writing on the wall was discernible to any sensible observer of the military situation from 2007 onwards. Yet, Prabhakaran and his followers were oblivious to reality even as the army advanced. “Kitta Varattum, Thittam Irukku” (Let them come near. We have a plan) was the parrot-like cry by the top leaders as the enemy neared. Apparently, Prabhakaran and the LTTE were not unduly concerned about the advancing armed forces for quite a while, as the Tigers were confident that the army would not be able to proceed beyond a certain point.

This assessment got skewered after the fall of Paranthan, which was a major turning point. Paranthan was followed by Kilinochchi and then Elephant Pass... the hasty evacuation of cadres trapped in the peninsula through a “mini-Dunkirk” type of operation indicated that the Tigers were indeed caught napping.

Even after losing the Jaffna-Kandy road or A-9 highway and all areas to its west, the LTTE was yet confident of withstanding the army for a much longer period in areas east of the A-9 highway. The final option was to “carve” out a large area in Mullaitheevvu district with access to the coast and then defend it strenuously.

Boxed into a small space

But the rapid progress of the Army during this phase took the LTTE by surprise. Within a relatively quick period, the various military divisions and task forces made sweeping strides into Tiger territory. As a result the LTTE and hundreds of thousands of civilians were boxed into a small space that kept on shrinking as the army continued to advance.

Despite the Army advancing, Prabhakaran believed wrongly that the LTTE could at some point deliver a crippling blow on the battlefront and exact a heavy casualty toll. This would demoralise the army and help reverse the situation, Prabhakaran appears to have surmised. The politico-military situation deteriorated, but Prabhakaran was pretty sure that at some point the military drive would grind to a halt.

Aanandapuram debacle

Apparently he was relying very much on the massive counter-offensive being planned to destroy army defences in the Puthukkudiyiruppu region. But the military debacle on 4-5 April 2009 at Aanandapuram resulting in the deaths of 623 cadres, including his northern force commander “Col” Theepan soured those plans. This writer then wrote that the LTTE would not be able to recover from the Aanandapuram defeat and that this defeat could be the defining moment of the war. That observation was subsequently proved correct.

Tripartite venture

Six weeks after Aanandapuram, the finale came in mid-May. A beleaguered Prabhakaran and his senior Tigers went into a brain-storming session. A decision was reached to launch a tripartite venture. One group of Tigers, including Prabhakaran was to break out from trapped positions and cross the lagoon and Paranthan-Mullaitheevu road or A-35 highway. Thereafter the Tigers would move into the vast Wanni jungles and operate. Some would move to the East.

A second group of Tigers would contact the army and negotiate terms of surrender. The main objective was to obtain urgently needed medical treatment for injured cadres, family members and civilians. The third group was to engage in fierce rear guard action.

The LTTE launched a massive counterattack on the armed forces shortly after midnight on Sunday, 17 May 2009. The attack was in three directions but mainly directed towards the Nandhikkadal lagoon area held by the 53 division. After fierce fighting, the three Tiger contingents broke through. The three contingents together numbered about 350-400. Almost all military leaders were part of the three groups trying to break out.

Black Tigers

A large number of Black Tigers died in the assault as explosive-strapped boys and girls jumped on army positions and blew themselves up. This created the “gaps” for other Tigers to penetrate the military cordon. Though Tigers breached the 53-division defences, the soldiers began an intensive artillery barrage in which many died. Also the army had set up multiple layers of defence with more personnel at the back.

The LTTE cadres who broke through were to some extent sandwiched in between and later cut down. With the assault resulting in failure and many Tigers being encircled, several LTTE cadres began consuming cyanide. Similarly, the Tiger “defenders” were also routed.

“Nanthikkadal”

Prabhakaran’s body was discovered before dawn on Tuesday. The body of the 54-year-old supreme leader of the LTTE was found on Tuesday, 19 May near the Mullaitheevu lagoon known as “Nanthikkadal” (sea of conches). It is widely believed that he had committed suicide by shooting himself. Soldiers of the 4th Vijayabahu infantry regiment led by Lt. Col. Rohitha Aluvihare claimed to have found the body.

Thus ended the life of the man who was once described by the LTTE’s political strategist, Anton Stanislaus Balasingham, as both “the President and Prime Minister of Tamil Eelam”. Army commander Sarath Fonseka announced the death officially at 12:15 p.m. on 19 May.

The ephemeral nature of power was illustrated vividly by the death of Prabhakaran who controlled what was perhaps the most powerful guerrilla organisation in the world. Prabhakaran who commenced his militant career with a single pistol had over the years built up the LTTE into a powerful movement running a shadow state. He acquired the status of being “Tamil National Leader” (Thesiyath Thalaiver), and was raised to divine status as “Sooriyathevan” (Sun God) by his sycophantic followers.

Prabhakaran, like a compulsive gambler, risked the entire existence of the Tamil people as a vibrant ethnicity in Sri Lanka for the elusive goal of Tamil Eelam. It was an all or nothing gamble for him. He was like an invading military general who burns his boats so that his soldiers have no choice other than to fight on for victory or face death. There is no turning back. If the soldiers win the war, the general will be praised for his steely determination. If they lose, there won’t be anyone left to tell the tale.

Irredeemable harm

Ultimately that is what had happened. Prabhakaran and the LTTE military machine are no more but the irredeemable harm caused to the Tamil people living in Sri Lanka, “lives after them”.

(The writer can be reached at [email protected].)