Protecting the State, or empowering the State? Sri Lanka’s counter-terrorism test

By replacing the Prevention of Terrorism Act, Sri Lanka has an opportunity to strengthen national security, constitutional democracy and investor confidence. That opportunity will be lost if exceptional powers are retained without effective safeguards.

Sri Lanka’s economic recovery has reached an important juncture. Real GDP expanded by 4.7% in the first half of 2026, and macroeconomic stabilisation has restored a measure of confidence after the devastating crisis of 2022. Yet, as the World Bank and the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) have emphasised, recovery is not synonymous with durable prosperity. Productivity, investment, employment, household welfare and resilience to external shocks remain pressing challenges.

Against this backdrop, the Government’s proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTB), intended to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979, deserves scrutiny extending beyond the familiar contest between national security and civil liberties.

The fundamental question is whether Sri Lanka can construct a legal framework that protects its people against genuine threats while strengthening the institutional credibility on which sustainable economic growth depends.

No responsible Government can disregard terrorism. Equally, no democratic Government should assume that granting itself extraordinary powers necessarily makes the country safer. The legitimacy of national security measures depends not only on their stated purpose but also on their precision, proportionality and accountability.

The burden of history

Introduced as temporary legislation in 1979, the PTA became a longstanding instrument of the State’s security apparatus. Its history is associated with allegations and documented instances of arbitrary detention, torture and the suppression of legitimate political activity, particularly affecting minority communities and Government critics.

For the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the principal constituent of the National People’s Power (NPP), this history carries particular significance. The party’s experience of severe State repression, especially during the late 1980s, formed part of its political identity. Its opposition to oppressive security laws was therefore more than an abstract commitment to civil liberties.

The transition from opposition to Government, however, presents a familiar democratic dilemma: whether political principles survive the acquisition of executive power.

The NPP’s reliance on the PTA in 2024, in the context of investigations into alleged threats against Israeli tourists in Arugam Bay, illustrates this tension. Governments must respond to genuine security concerns, and previous opposition positions cannot substitute for the responsibilities of office. But a party with direct historical experience of exceptional State powers has an especially compelling reason to ensure that its replacement legislation establishes stronger safeguards.

Nor should the Opposition be exempt from scrutiny. The United National Party enacted the PTA, while subsequent Governments pursued replacement legislation, including the controversial proposals of 2018 and 2023. Political actors across the spectrum have participated in, defended or inherited aspects of this legal framework.

Past inconsistency does not invalidate present criticism. Rather, it reinforces a more demanding standard: civil liberties must be defended as constitutional principles, not deployed selectively as instruments of political advantage.

Legal certainty is an economic asset

The central test of counter-terrorism legislation is whether it defines prohibited conduct with sufficient precision to distinguish genuine terrorist activity from lawful political, journalistic, academic and industrial activity.

Lon L. Fuller, in The Morality of Law, identified clarity and consistency as essential attributes of legality. Lord Bingham, in The Rule of Law, similarly stressed that laws must be accessible, intelligible and predictable.

These principles have direct economic significance.

Entrepreneurs need confidence that commercial disputes and business risks will be governed by predictable rules. Investors require assurance that regulatory and judicial decisions will not depend on arbitrary discretion. Workers and trade unions must be able to exercise lawful rights without fearing that industrial action will be misconstrued as a security offence. Journalists and researchers need space to investigate corruption, scrutinise public expenditure and expose institutional failure.

Where criminal prohibitions are vague, the costs extend beyond those directly prosecuted. Uncertainty can discourage investment, weaken competition, reduce the quality of public debate and increase the perceived risk of doing business.

This is especially consequential for Sri Lanka as it seeks export-led growth, foreign capital, technological upgrading and stronger integration into international markets. Legal predictability is not a substitute for sound macroeconomic policy; it is one of the institutional conditions that makes such policy effective.

The IPS’s State of the Economy 2026 underscores the need to move beyond stabilisation towards productivity-led and resilient growth. That transition requires capable institutions, credible rules and public confidence that the law applies impartially.

Safeguards must work in practice

The proposed PSTB contains provisions intended to protect peaceful protest, advocacy, dissent and industrial action. Such recognition is welcome. However, protective language cannot be assessed in isolation from the offences it qualifies, the powers it authorises and the remedies available to those affected.

In its October 2026 assessment, Human Rights Watch raised concerns about the breadth of the terrorism definition, military search and arrest powers, executive detention authority and restrictions affecting fundamental freedoms. Amnesty International likewise acknowledged improvements over earlier drafts while arguing that significant deficiencies remain, including the potential for prolonged detention without charge and inadequate guarantees against arbitrary enforcement. These are substantive criticisms that Parliament should address through examination of the actual text, not dismiss as political opposition or foreign interference.

The distinction between formal safeguards and effective protection is crucial. A person eventually acquitted may nevertheless have lost years of liberty, employment, income and reputation. The presumption of innocence offers little practical comfort if the process itself becomes a punishment.

Roscoe Pound’s distinction between “law in books” and “law in action” captures the problem. The quality of legislation depends not merely on its wording but also on the institutions implementing it: independent courts, competent investigators, access to lawyers, timely trials and effective remedies for abuse.

Sri Lanka should therefore insist on a narrowly defined terrorism offence linked to genuinely terrorist conduct; explicit protection for peaceful political, journalistic, academic and trade-union activity; prompt and meaningful judicial control over detention; and independent investigation of allegations of torture or unlawful arrest.

Military involvement in civilian law enforcement requires particularly strong justification and oversight. Likewise, powers to restrict movement, assemblies or organisations must be subject to clear legal thresholds, independent review and effective avenues of appeal.

Where ordinary criminal law can adequately address an offence, the Government should explain why exceptional powers are necessary. Where extraordinary measures are genuinely indispensable, they should be proportionate, time-limited and reviewable.

The State is not the Government

 An underlying conceptual error in this debate is the tendency to conflate the State with the Government of the day.

In a constitutional democracy, the State comprises the institutions and legal order through which public authority is exercised. Governments temporarily administer those institutions; they do not own them. Criticism of a Government is not inherently hostility towards the country, and peaceful dissent is not a threat to constitutional sovereignty.

This distinction matters particularly when a governing party commands a substantial parliamentary majority. The NPP’s electoral mandate gives it authority to govern, but democratic legitimacy also requires respect for institutional checks, independent scrutiny and the possibility of electoral accountability.

Concerns about delayed Provincial Council elections and the pace of institutional reform reinforce the importance of this principle. Devolved representation, legislative oversight and independent adjudication are not administrative inconveniences. They are mechanisms through which power is restrained and citizens retain meaningful avenues to influence public affairs.

It would be premature to equate every delay or contested legislative initiative with authoritarian consolidation. Yet neither should democratic backsliding be assessed solely by whether elections continue to occur. The quality of democracy also depends on whether opposition, scrutiny and constitutional remedies remain effective between elections.

Write the law for the Government that comes next

The most revealing test of the PSTB is whether its provisions would remain acceptable if administered tomorrow by a Government whose political convictions the present Government strongly opposed.

Would a journalist investigating powerful interests remain protected? Would a trade union be able to organise a disruptive but lawful strike? Would a minority community trust the authorities to distinguish political mobilisation from terrorism? Could a detainee obtain an effective remedy against an unlawful executive order?

These questions are not distractions from national security. They are tests of legislative design.

The Government should undertake meaningful consultation with the legal profession, human rights institutions, journalists, trade unions, minority communities and business representatives. Parliament should scrutinise the Bill clause by clause and revise provisions that fail to meet constitutional and international human rights standards. Independent oversight must be substantive rather than merely administrative, and enforcement must be accompanied by transparent accountability.

The economic case for such safeguards is compelling. Sri Lanka needs investment, innovation, productive employment and public institutions capable of delivering education, healthcare, infrastructure and social protection despite tight fiscal constraints. These objectives cannot be secured by economic incentives alone. They also require confidence that public authority is exercised predictably, impartially and within the law.

A democratic opportunity

Sri Lanka has an opportunity to break with the legacy of the PTA rather than reproduce it under a different name. The Government must demonstrate that national security does not require insulating executive power from scrutiny. The Opposition must apply its principles consistently. Parliament must ensure that the final law is judged by its foreseeable consequences, not its reassuring title.

The ultimate purpose of counter-terrorism legislation is to protect people, their freedoms and the constitutional order against genuine threats. It is not to maximise the coercive capacity of the State.

For a country seeking to transform post-crisis recovery into durable, inclusive prosperity, this distinction is fundamental. Strong institutions, enforceable rights and credible accountability are not obstacles to economic development. They are among its foundations.

A democratic State must be strong enough to confront terrorism and sufficiently restrained to ensure that its citizens do not fear the very law enacted in their name. Sri Lanka’s challenge is not merely to replace the PTA, but to establish a constitutional standard under which national security and human freedom reinforce, rather than undermine, each other.