Office of Auditor General and its place in fiscal governance framework

Sri Lanka is presently without a substantive Auditor General following the retirement of the previous office holder in April 2025, and this article examines the institutional implications of that circumstance purely from a professional, constitutional, and comparative public-governance perspective, and not otherwise, with reference to established international audit standards and practice.

The office of the Auditor General occupies a central position in Sri Lanka’s constitutional architecture. It is intended to provide independent assurance to the Parliament of Sri Lanka on the use of public resources across Government departments, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), provincial councils, local authorities, and statutory bodies. Through audit reports and opinions, the Auditor General supports parliamentary oversight and contributes to transparency, fiscal discipline, and confidence in public financial management.

From an institutional standpoint, the Auditor General’s responsibilities extend well beyond transactional verification. Public-sector audit encompasses assessment of compliance with law, evaluation of internal control systems, and identification of financial and governance risks across the public sector. These functions are integral to any modern system of accountability, particularly in environments characterised by complex fiscal arrangements and multi-tiered governance structures.

Sri Lanka’s broader experience with public finance management illustrates the relevance of strong audit institutions. Over time, audit reports have drawn attention to matters such as recurring SOE losses, weaknesses in expenditure controls, and governance gaps. Many jurisdictions incorporate these observations into their normal accountability process, aiming to guide corrective action, refine policy, and foster institutional learning. Their effectiveness depends on the strength, authority, and credibility of the institutions that generate them.

The Auditor General performs a role that is institutionally distinct from that of ministries, regulatory agencies, or boards of management. While line institutions focus on policy execution and operational mandates, the Auditor General provides a consolidated, whole-of-Government perspective on financial stewardship. By synthesising information across sectors and entities, the office assists Parliament in understanding systemic patterns rather than isolated issues. This integrative function is a defining feature of a Supreme Audit Institution.

Comparative international practice highlights the importance of continuity, clarity of mandate, and professional authority at the apex of public audit. Global standards recognise that audit independence is not only legal in nature but also functional, supported by security of tenure, operational autonomy, and professional standing. These attributes underpin the capacity of the auditor general to exercise independent judgment across routine as well as complex audit environments.

Discussion has also arisen regarding the qualifications appropriate for the office of Auditor General. Professional accounting qualifications are clearly relevant and important. However, international standards and comparative practice indicate that professional designation alone is not determinative of suitability for leadership of a Supreme Audit Institution. The functional demands of the office require a broader combination of competencies.

The International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, ( INTOSAI) the global body for public-sector audit, articulates standards that reflect this position. INTOSAI’s foundational declarations emphasise institutional independence, security of tenure, freedom from external influence, and authority to report objectively. They do not prescribe specific professional credentials, reflecting the diversity of institutional arrangements across jurisdictions.

INTOSAI standards further recognise that public-sector audit differs fundamentally from private-sector assurance. Leadership of a Supreme Audit Institution requires familiarity with public finance systems, constitutional and parliamentary accountability, and performance evaluation within a Governmental context. Accordingly, international practice places significant weight on relevant public-sector audit experience, institutional knowledge, leadership capability, and ethical independence, rather than on qualifications alone.

From a professional governance perspective, the appointment of a suitably qualified and experienced auditor general may therefore be viewed as an integral element of sound constitutional administration and public financial management. We should best understand such appointments not in political terms, but rather through objective considerations of institutional design, comparative practice, and professional competence

Commonwealth practice illustrates this diversity. In several jurisdictions, including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, Auditors General are drawn from career public audit services rather than the private profession. In others, such as Australia, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom, professional accounting qualifications are common, but appointments are typically based on demonstrated leadership in public audit and governance rather than credentials in isolation. Sri Lanka›s historical practice of appointing professionally qualified individuals (Chartered Accountants) with extensive public-sector audit experience is consistent with these comparative standards.

It is therefore useful to distinguish between professional inclusivity and institutional suitability. Emphasising relevant experience and independence does not imply exclusion of any profession; rather, it reflects the functional requirements of a constitutional office. International standards consistently warn against equating professional designation with constitutional fitness. Instead, they stress the ability to make independent decisions, earn respect from institutions, and work well with the legislature.

The effectiveness of the Auditor General ultimately depends on the institutional environment in which the office operates, including legislative engagement, audit follow-up mechanisms, and respect for audit independence. Strong audit institutions are associated internationally with improved fiscal transparency, more effective oversight, and sustained public trust.

From a professional governance perspective, the appointment of a suitably qualified and experienced auditor general may therefore be viewed as an integral element of sound constitutional administration and public financial management. We should best understand such appointments not in political terms, but rather through objective considerations of institutional design, comparative practice, and professional competence

(The writer, former Chairman of the Finance Commission, is a senior professional with experience across public and private sectors in governance, policy, and institutional reform)