Latest Geneva resolution: Putting Sri Lanka’s commitment to the test

Importantly, the Foreign Minister’s statement notes the futility of the requests made for a call of vote on previous occasions, which led to Sri Lanka’s ‘defeat’ at the Council

Apparently, the challenge before the NPP Government today in dealing with Geneva is three-fold: how to salvage Sri Lanka with the least damage (damage control); how to present itself as a responsible Government that does things on its own without being confrontational (non-confrontational approach); and what dividends such a strategy would yield, influencing outcomes of other global or regional processes potentially beneficial to the country in the long term as it emerges from the economic mess that the public still suffers 

Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath made a statement in Parliament on Thursday, providing an explanation of Sri Lanka’s position at the 60th session of the Human Rights Council. On 8 September 2025, he delivered the country statement during the consideration of the comprehensive report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka. Almost a month later, on 6 October 2025 when resolution 60/1 on Sri Lanka was adopted by the Council without a vote, Sri Lanka’s permanent representative to the UN in Geneva addressed the Council reiterating the Government’s position and indicating Sri Lanka’s rejection of the resolution. 

Interestingly, the Minister’ statement in Parliament, the latest in the series, ascribes to resolution 46/1 (2021) the intensification of internationalisation of ‘domestic’ concerns through the adoption of Sri Lanka Accountability Project (SLAP). It goes on to criticise the previous Governments being responsible for internationalisation and for the resolutions adopted in 2012, 2013 and 2014, and then in 2021 and 2022 after failing to defeat them, only having wasted public funds. 

The statement seems to grudgingly acknowledge some positive developments made since 2015, including the establishment of the Office on Missing Persons and the Office for Reparations during that period. 

Regrets have, however, been expressed regarding the inconsistent approaches adopted by different Governments from 2009 to 2022, with regard to resolutions promoted/adopted. Such approaches varied from initiation of own resolution (2009), canvassing against and outright rejection of resolutions (2012, 2013, 2014), endorsement of resolutions (co-sponsorship, 2015, 2017, 2019), rejection of resolutions with a strong emphasis on certain paragraphs (2021, 2022), to consensual adoption of a ‘smart’ resolution (roll-over, 2024). 

An attempt at historical revisionism

Withdrawal of co-sponsorship from resolution 30/1 of 2015, announced by the Gotabaya Government in 2020, which was followed through in 2021 at the Council, was a manifestation of an attempt at historical revisionism, marking a radical approach in this context, influenced by the attitude of that Government to polarise the domestic vote base in its favour through divisive rhetoric.

Importantly, the Foreign Minister’s statement notes the futility of the requests made for a call of vote on previous occasions, which led to Sri Lanka’s ‘defeat’ at the Council. The point made there is about the waste of public funds as a result of a number of foreign trips undertaken by Ministers and officials, obviously for canvassing against resolutions which had the remotest chances of being defeated. 

The argument made in this respect was that the Governments concerned were ostentatious and unnecessarily drained financial resources, in the name of fighting resolutions which they were to lose, in order to create public impressions in Sri Lanka that they were indeed asserting the sovereignty of the country. It also indicates that, had such efforts and resources been directed to solving the issues that gave rise to the resolutions, Sri Lanka will not be facing a Geneva process today.

There were numerous instances in the past when not just the Ministers and officials were sent abroad for lobbying to ‘protect’ the Government from ‘sinister’ international forces which they claimed were all out to see a ‘regime change’ including through the imposition of resolutions ‘against’ the Government. Also, some selected representatives of NGOs and religious leaders allegedly received Government backing to go to some key European cities to lobby for the ‘defeat’ of resolutions. 

The Foreign Minister’s concern regarding the waste of public funds is explicable by taking a not-too-distant example of a former Foreign Minister’s visit to Geneva. 

His immediate predecessor travelled to Geneva twice in September/October 2022. During his first visit at state expense in September 2022, it was loudly clear that the resolution, if put to vote, would carry, and not be defeated. Some countries indicated to him as well as to Sri Lanka’s representatives elsewhere that the Government was to lose the vote. Nevertheless, his immediate predecessor made another visit to Geneva, second time during the same session, to ‘canvas’ the rejection of the resolution in vain. Officials had pointed out that the Minister travelling to Geneva for a second time was not necessary, as the Government was poised for a defeat. On both occasions, he was accompanied by at least three officials from Colombo. Hasn’t the State meaninglessly coughed out a further sum of money for his and his team of officials’ travel and stay there?

Utter waste of public funds

The utter waste of public funds in the name of fighting resolutions which the respective Governments lost was a public concern. It was a concern of the Sri Lankan citizens at a time when the economy wouldn’t sustain such a lavish expenditure. After the economic crisis came to a head in 2022 and immediately thereafter, any foreign travels costing the State billions of rupees cumulatively or otherwise, for purposes that were either private or of a private-official mix, or in the worst case scenario, on missions whose results were predictably not positive, could only amount to a criminal waste of public funds. 

Such wasteful trips only peaked during 2009 and 2014, and almost became the norm immediately after the economic crisis. For instance, in 2012, the Opposition MP Sajith Premadasa questioned the Foreign Minister of the time about the number of delegates who travelled to Geneva that year for the Council session and the Government expenditure in this regard. In reply, the then Foreign Minister refused to disclose the number of delegates citing ‘national security’ but admitted that a staggering Rs. 59 million had been spent on this visit. In 2012, the Government secured only 15 out of 47 votes at HRC, resulting in the adoption of the resolution. 

Coming back to the question of a call of vote on resolutions that came up within the Council in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2021 and 2022, there are some direct references in Minister Herath’s statement to the number of votes most resolutions received when they were put to action by the Council. Since 2009 when Sri Lanka floated its own resolution -- a ‘victory’ for the 13th Amendment, and for the Presidential assurance to the UN secretary general in their joint statement of May 2009 regarding accountability process-- all resolutions that were put to vote thereafter saw a progressive reduction in the number of votes recorded “Against”. If this was the case, what then to say of it: Was it a national shame or success?

In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the MR Government built Sri Lanka’s position with regard to resolutions adopted and the voting pattern observed, on three particular points: 1. No solutions to the problems raised in Geneva should be externally imposed; 2. The Government should be allowed “time and space” to evolve such solutions; 3. All abstentions during the Council’s actions on resolutions should be added to the opposing votes such resolutions recorded. It was argued that the resolutions thus adopted lacked credibility and legitimacy since abstentions and opposing votes together outweighed affirmative votes. 

It was further argued that the number of affirmative votes was less than the simple majority of the total membership of the Council (meaning less than 24 of 47-member Council). Needless to say that no progress on ‘home grown’ solutions took place despite this rhetoric. On the contrary, the government ignored the work of its own LLRC.

Evolving appropriate local mechanisms

Strikingly, Foreign Minister Herath uses the same argument in relation to the need for evolving appropriate local mechanisms. On the other hand, he completely rejects the Malthusian calculus on counting the votes. With regard to “time and space”, unlike the earlier approach of leaving it open-ended without doing anything substantive, he seems to suggest that the Government would take domestic action in such a manner that the SLAP would be concluded. 

What does this mean in practical terms? Would some concrete actions on some more serious pending concerns follow before the 66th session of the Council (September 2027)? By which time, the core-group, co-sponsors and other concerned actors in the international community would hopefully see little reason or incentive to prolong the consideration of the question of human rights, accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. 

In 2015, the late Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera stated that the reason the then-Government co-sponsored resolution 30/1 was to take into its own hands, matters which have been ‘internationalised’ due to the failure to implement the recommendations of the LLRC, and the lack of domestic actions and commitment by the MR Government. 

Interestingly, the statement made in Parliament seems to absorb this idea and use it with a different thrust. It speaks about bringing back to the domestic level matters that have been internationalised since 2021 when the Gotabaya Government rejected the Geneva resolution (46/1) and walked away from resolution 30/1 of 2015. 

A highly nationalistic approach and a serious lack of imagination

It was a combination of a highly nationalistic approach and a serious lack of imagination and strategy that landed the country in the vortex of an external evidence-gathering mechanism via operative para 6 of resolution 46/1 of 2021. It’s certainly a dangerous threshold for the government of the day and the Foreign Ministry to have stepped up to. And in the evolution of the Geneva process involving Sri Lanka, it undoubtedly marked an all-time low. 

Apparently, the challenge before the NPP Government today in dealing with Geneva is three-fold: how to salvage Sri Lanka with the least damage (damage control); how to present itself as a responsible Government that does things on its own without being confrontational (non-confrontational approach); and what dividends such a strategy would yield, influencing outcomes of other global or regional processes potentially beneficial to the country in the long term as it emerges from the economic mess that the public still suffers (beneficiality). 

Critics may question the decision of the Government not to ask a friendly country, a member of the Council, to request a vote on the resolution. But such an approach, if it had been pursued this time, would have led once again to divisive vote within the Council and possibly led to a harsher resolution.

Do those who criticise, now remember how Sri Lanka ‘surrendered’ its sovereignty willingly, even in a nominal sense, in the very process of seeking the support of other countries to vote against resolutions? Haven’t the MR, Gotabaya and RW governments signed up to pledges to support various candidatures and other interests of such countries in the UN system and outside, in return for their support to defeat the resolutions which anyway carried? Is Sri Lanka not indebted to those countries at least for the next 10 years, or so?

It is all the more evident that every Government since 2009 has adopted a different approach to dealing with human rights concerns in Geneva. As explained, it has ranged from; the initiation of its own resolution; total rejection followed by a call of vote, and confrontation; endorsement and co-sponsorship; rejection with a special focus on certain paragraphs; and to a consensual adoption (2024). Are these not time-piece approaches, only limited by change of government, or by other constraining political factors? If these are among actions that the previous Governments pursued avowedly in the interests of the country, one may ask what prevents this Government from pursuing what it thinks is the most appropriate of all options available in the current circumstances. 

This is not a defence of the Government. There are a number of issues on which one may disagree. Its continued prevarication on the Gaza situation/the Question of Palestine until it was clear in New York that the multilateral pendulum swung in favour of calling for an independent state of Palestine through a two-state solution, represented an ostrich-like behaviour, which can never be justified. 

The elephant in the room 

All this said, it must be conceded, nevertheless, that a long-term sustainable approach to Geneva concerns is what is still missing in the equation. The elephant in the room is the security and law sector reform. If the Government can ensure that there are independent, inclusive, credible, well-resourced, and robust institutions that work best, without political or intelligence meddling, and that the rule of law prevails, it could go a long way in shifting the locus of action from Geneva or elsewhere back to Sri Lanka in the manner the Government desires to bring such concerns to the “domestic level”. 

Such an approach requires engagement and dialogue. A non-confrontational posture which puts premium on respectful engagement should continue to be manifested even if an outcome of a particular process bearing upon the same concerns as have impelled actions on the external front, may not be formally subscribed to, or even rejected. 

What is more important in this context is how a responsible state internalises norms, finds ways and means of resolving issues and concerns, leaves no incentive for future violations of human rights, and ensures fairness and justice, undone either by itself or by a different dispensation later. Such would be the progressive policy underpinned by guarantees of non-recurrence. 

Minister Herath speaks about the importance of non-recurrence of conflicts. But one is well advised not to look at it from a conflict angle alone. It’s common knowledge that armed conflict engenders serious violations of the principles of humanitarian law in addition to gross violations of human rights. They should be prevented, and when they occur, should be fully accounted for. Non-recurrence, nevertheless, is also about systemic discrimination or violence against people and as well as about serious violations of human rights. 

Bringing the focus back to his Parliamentary statement, Foreign Minister Herath seems to have clarified why the NPP Government adopted the approach it did at the just-concluded 60th session of the Council. Perhaps it testifies to the commitment of the Government to continue to engage with the concerned actors in the international community, likely ensuring that the Government emerges from the Geneva process, by committing itself to taking, apparently of its own volition, pragmatic domestic actions. 

Even as the Government has clothed its official stance, obviously for domestic political consumption, in a language of rejection, it is apparent that there is pronounced emphasis that it is not pursuing a path of confrontation, but is quite willing to remain engaged. 

But as the axiom goes, actions speak louder than words. 

(The writer, a former Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva and retired foreign service officer, may be contacted via email: [email protected].)