Burden-sharing or burden-shifting? The Gulf and the cost of war

Jamal Salim Farran holds a child’s pair of trousers as he stands on the rubble of a building damaged in an Israeli strike in Tyre, Lebanon, 5 April 2026 

Introduction

In the midst of an escalating confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, a striking proposition has reportedly emerged from Washington: that Arab states—particularly those of the Gulf—should help finance the war effort. The suggestion, conveyed by White House officials as an idea under consideration by Donald J. Trump, has already generated unease across diplomatic and strategic circles. Even as a tentative proposal, it raises a deeper and more consequential question: is this a legitimate form of burden-sharing among allies, or a troubling shift toward burden-shifting at the expense of those already most exposed to the risks of war?

The ethics of responsibility

The ethical tension inherent in this proposal is difficult to ignore. The Gulf states are not detached observers of the unfolding conflict. They are among its most vulnerable stakeholders, situated at the very frontline of regional instability.

Countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have already borne significant consequences. The threat of retaliatory strikes, the vulnerability of critical energy infrastructure, and the disruption of maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz have imposed real and immediate costs. These states are compelled to invest heavily in defensive systems, internal security, and economic stabilisation.

To ask these same countries to finance the war itself introduces a profound moral contradiction. It shifts the financial burden from those who initiate and prosecute military action to those who must endure its consequences. In doing so, it undermines a core ethical principle of international conduct: that responsibility must rest with those who take the decisions that lead to war.

Such an approach risks normalising a system in which the most exposed actors are not only expected to absorb the shocks of conflict but also to subsidise its continuation. It transforms partnership into obligation and dilutes the moral clarity that should underpin collective security arrangements.

Strategic responsibility and ownership of war

From a strategic standpoint, the proposal reveals a deeper inconsistency. Military action, particularly when justified on grounds of national or allied security, carries with it an implicit expectation of ownership. Those who make the decision to go to war are also expected to bear its costs—financial, political, and reputational.

If the United States determines that military action against Iran is necessary, whether for its own security or that of its allies, then strategic coherence demands that it assume primary responsibility for that decision. Externalising the financial burden to third parties disrupts this coherence and creates a disconnect between authority and accountability.

For the Gulf states, this introduces a complex strategic dilemma. Many have, in recent years, pursued policies aimed at reducing regional tensions while maintaining balanced relations with major powers. The recalibration of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran reflects a broader regional inclination toward de-escalation rather than confrontation.

A request to finance the war risks undermining these efforts. It pressures Gulf states to align more closely with a conflict trajectory that may not fully correspond to their own strategic interests. In doing so, it narrows their diplomatic flexibility and exposes them to greater long-term risk.

Origins of the conflict and the question of responsibility

The origins of the conflict further complicate the moral and strategic logic of the proposal. The war did not emerge as a multilateral necessity endorsed by the international community, but rather as a joint military initiative led by the United States and Israel, following long-standing Israeli concerns over Iran’s strategic capabilities. While Washington has articulated its own security justifications, it is evident that Israeli threat perceptions and strategic objectives have played a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of the conflict.

In this context, asking third-party states—particularly those already exposed to its consequences—to finance the war raises fundamental questions about fairness and responsibility. It extends the circle of obligation far beyond those who initiated and shaped the conflict, while leaving decision-making concentrated in the hands of a few.

The limits of historical precedent

Supporters of burden-sharing may seek to draw parallels with the Gulf War, during which regional states contributed financially to a U.S.-led military campaign. Yet such comparisons are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, misleading..

If the United States determines that military action against Iran is necessary, whether for its own security or that of its allies, then strategic coherence demands that it assume primary responsibility for that decision. Externalising the financial burden to third parties disrupts this coherence and creates a disconnect between authority and accountability. For the Gulf states, this introduces a complex strategic dilemma. Many have, in recent years, pursued policies aimed at reducing regional tensions while maintaining balanced relations with major powers. The recalibration of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran reflects a broader regional inclination toward de-escalation rather than confrontation

The 1991 conflict followed a clear violation of international law—the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq—and was supported by a broad international coalition under explicit United Nations Security Council authorisation. The financial contributions made by regional actors were therefore embedded within a framework of collective legitimacy and shared purpose.

The present situation differs in fundamental respects. The legal justification for military action remains contested, the absence of a comparable multilateral mandate is evident, and the strategic objectives themselves are subject to debate. To invoke the precedent of 1991 without acknowledging these differences risks obscuring more than it clarifies.

Legal ambiguity and questions of complicity

The legal dimension of the proposal introduces additional concerns. Under the framework of the United Nations Charter, the use of force is governed by strict limitations. In the absence of clear justification through self-defence or Security Council authorisation, military action enters a contested legal domain.

In such a context, financial contributions from third-party states raise the possibility of complicity. Should such funding support operations that result in civilian harm or damage to non-military infrastructure, contributing states could face legal and reputational consequences. Modern interpretations of international humanitarian law increasingly recognise that responsibility extends beyond direct combatants to those who enable or sustain military operations.

Furthermore, if such contributions are sought under political pressure, the issue may extend into the realm of coercion. This would challenge the principle of sovereign equality, a cornerstone of the international system, and risk setting a precedent whereby financial obligations are imposed rather than voluntarily assumed.

Iran's Minister of Science Hossein Simaee Sarraf inspects the damage at the research building of the Shahid Beheshti University, which was damaged by a US-Israeli strike on 4 April 2026 

Transactional security and the evolution of alliances

The proposal also reflects a broader shift in the nature of international alliances. Under the approach associated with Donald J. Trump, relationships between states are increasingly framed in transactional terms, where security is linked to financial contribution.

While burden-sharing has long been a feature of alliance politics, its extension into the financing of active conflict represents a significant departure from established norms. It redefines alliances not as partnerships grounded in shared interests and mutual commitments, but as arrangements subject to financial negotiation.

For the Gulf states, this raises important questions about the reliability and character of their security relationships. If protection is contingent upon payment, then the distinction between partnership and dependency becomes increasingly blurred. Trust, once anchored in strategic alignment, risks being replaced by a more conditional and uncertain framework.

A region already bearing the cost

It is essential to recognise that the Gulf states are already paying a substantial price for the current conflict. The economic impact of regional instability, the security burden of heightened military readiness, and the political challenges of navigating a volatile environment all impose significant costs.

These are not abstract or future concerns; they are immediate realities. The expectation that these states should assume additional financial responsibility for the prosecution of the war risks compounding these burdens beyond what is strategically or politically sustainable.

Conclusion: Redefining the boundaries of responsibility

The proposal that Gulf states should finance the war against Iran represents more than a tactical suggestion. It signals a broader shift in how responsibility is conceived and distributed in contemporary international relations. What is presented as burden-sharing, in reality, begins to resemble burden-shifting—transferring costs without  control and imposing obligations without corresponding authority. 

For the United States, the issue is ultimately one of credibility. Leadership in international affairs depends not only on the capacity to act, but on the willingness to align power with responsibility. To ask those most exposed to the consequences of war to finance its continuation is to test the limits of that alignment—and to risk undermining the very foundations upon which enduring partnerships are built.

 (The author is former Sri Lanka’s  Ambassador to EU, Belgium, Turkey, Ukraine   and Saudi Arabia and former Additional Secretary, Foreign Affairs Ministry.)