Saturday Oct 17, 2026
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The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka’s October 2026 report on the Northern and Eastern Provinces records specific, long-standing problems (The Human Rights Situation of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka). Its sections on the 1990 expulsion of Northern Muslims and on freedom of religion or belief have attracted attention. The report documents the LTTE’s forced eviction of roughly 75,000 Muslims, the enduring effects of that displacement, barriers to return and secure tenure, and instances of selective administrative practice. These findings warrant serious examination. They do not constitute a communal victory. Their value lies in the practical avenues they open for peaceful coexistence, provided the Government demonstrates the will to support them.
Limits of communal victory narratives
Official recognition of past wrongs is not political vindication. The report catalogues particular failures and recommends concrete steps. It does not establish that one community’s losses were unique in kind, nor does it erase harms suffered by others. Framing the document as a long-overdue triumph for any single group risks converting an administrative process into another round of competitive grievance. Such framing also tends to confirm existing suspicions that the return of Northern Muslims is viewed by some local officials as a threat rather than as the exercise of a legal right. A more constructive reading treats the findings as an opportunity to open better avenues for shared security of tenure, equal access to services, and ordinary neighbourly relations.
Historical circumstances and shared accountability
The politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s were constrained and violent. The LTTE sought a mono-ethnic North and employed mass expulsion to advance that objective. The State confronted an insurgency that had demonstrated both military capacity and willingness to attack civilians. Local populations lived under successive occupations, shortages, and fear. These conditions help explain why certain decisions were taken; they do not render those decisions immune from later examination. Understanding context is necessary if the country is to avoid simplified moral narratives that assign permanent roles of pure victim and pure perpetrator. Parallel gaps exist in the investigation of enforced disappearances, the return of military-occupied land, and the consistent enforcement of court orders. Selective attention to one set of gaps while ignoring others would undermine the credibility of any remedial process and close rather than open avenues for coexistence.
National interest and practical avenues
Sri Lanka’s practical interest lies in treating the identified problems as national rather than communal. Land-title insecurity, missing documentation, selective application of circulars, and prolonged occupation of private land affect residents of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The institutions capable of regularising ownership for Northern Muslim families in Puttalam, or of facilitating the return of those who wish to go back to their original districts, are the same institutions that can resolve overlapping claims involving Tamil and Sinhalese residents. A resettlement and documentation program designed for one displaced population can be structured so that it does not generate fresh grievances among others who have waited equally long. Shared economic activities—fisheries, agriculture, markets, and local infrastructure—offer further practical avenues. When communities work together on irrigation, disaster recovery, or school facilities, the incentive to maintain exclusive historical claims diminishes.
Equal treatment in practice
Equal treatment requires consistent application of existing rules rather than new communal preferences. On land, the Government can publish a time-bound program to regularise ownership of State land occupied by long-displaced families, apply identical documentary standards regardless of ethnicity or religion, and discipline officials who delay transfers on discriminatory grounds. On religion, it can issue a clear circular confirming that existing rules do not prohibit religious attire provided identification requirements are met, standardise procedures for places of worship, and enforce court orders on contested sites. On employment, public vacancies and promotion criteria in the North and East should be published with uniform tests and language requirements matched to the actual needs of the post; recruitment audits should identify and correct patterns of exclusion; and vocational training should be open to all, with placement data monitored for fairness. These steps—transparent criteria, fixed timelines, public reporting, and disciplinary follow-through—rely on existing law and administrative authority. Their implementation would reduce perceptions of selective justice and open better avenues for coexistence.
Changed climate and choice of coexistence
The post-war environment differs markedly from the years of active conflict. Open hostilities have ended. Large-scale displacement is no longer driven by combat. Economic pressures, disaster recovery, and ordinary livelihood demands occupy more public attention than wartime narratives. Political leadership has changed. Institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, the Office for Reparations, and the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation continue to operate and have, in some cases, engaged directly with affected communities. These shifts create space for peaceful coexistence that did not exist during the war. Political forgiveness need not mean forgetting specific facts. It can mean accepting that many who made decisions under wartime conditions are no longer in authority, and that future security and prosperity depend on shared rules rather than permanent moral hierarchies. It can also mean rebuilding practical relations among communities that once lived as neighbours.
Government’s will to support better avenues
The State retains the central responsibility. Existing constitutional provisions on equality, freedom of religion, and property, together with ordinary land, labour, and administrative law, are sufficient for most of the concrete problems identified. What has been missing is consistent application and visible political will. Regularising ownership of State land, enforcing existing court orders, reviewing circulars that produce discriminatory effects, withdrawing military economic activity from civilian sectors, and applying uniform recruitment standards do not require new foundational legislation. A narrowly focused inquiry into the 1990 expulsion can supply the missing official recognition without reopening every wartime controversy. The Government can demonstrate its will by issuing a single public directive that restates the principle of equal treatment, sets timelines, allocates modest resources for documentation and training, and requires periodic public reporting. Such actions would signal that the State supports avenues for coexistence and treats all residents of the North and East as equal Sri Lankan citizens.
Managing external pressures through domestic progress
Geopolitical commentary on Sri Lanka’s human rights record, land questions, and minority issues continues. Such pressures are more manageable when domestic institutions demonstrate that they can examine past events, apply existing law without systematic favouritism, and deliver tangible improvements in property security, service delivery, and employment opportunity. International statements lose force when local processes produce visible results. Managing the external dimension therefore depends less on rhetorical resistance than on the steady functioning of domestic remedies and the Government’s visible support for practical avenues of coexistence.
Conclusion
The HRCSL report records real problems. It does not declare winners. Its lasting value will depend on whether it opens better avenues for peaceful coexistence and whether the Government shows the will to support them. Secure tenure, consistent administration, equal access to employment and services, and shared economic activity under existing law offer practical paths forward. The climate has changed. The remaining question is whether institutions and communities are prepared to use that change to live together as Sri Lankans under shared rules rather than as permanent adversaries in an unfinished conflict.
(This analysis is offered in the interest of national security, institutional reform, and public safety. The writer is a retired Senior Superintendent of Police, former head of the counter terrorism desk at the State Intelligence Service, a former member of the Sri Lanka Wakfs Board, and the author of Security Beyond Enforcement: Practical Approaches for a Safer Nation (2026). [email protected])