Activity without accountability: Sri Lanka’s problematic approach to cybersecurity

Friday, 20 November 2026 00:24 -     - {{hitsCtrl.values.hits}}

 


 

Digital Economy Deputy Minister Eranga Weeraratne posted to his Facebook this week two short, but significant video clips of presentations made by him to Parliament. Asked how Sri Lanka CERT (SL-CERT) checks the security of Government institutions, MP Weeraratne told Parliament that SL-CERT tests Government systems in detail – 331 so far – but only when an institution asks, despite a Cabinet-approved policy that already requires regular checks. It also monitors the public websites and online services of 150 organisations from outside (the National Cyber Security Operations Centre watches those deemed critical around the clock), and between January and October 2026 sent 2,109 warnings to 112 institutions about problems ranging from leaked credentials and malware infections to fake websites impersonating Government agencies. 

On the PHP flaws, he told Parliament the Secretary to his Ministry had notified 156 institutions that their websites were affected, without saying when, and that a circular had gone to every ministry and department. He conceded that SL-CERT has no legal power to make Government bodies follow the State’s own cybersecurity policy, and then explained why it still has none. Under the previous Government, two rival Bills, one civilian and one military, stalled when the Attorney General found that their functions overlapped and nobody could settle whether a civilian or a defence body should lead. A committee appointed by the President and chaired by a retired Court of Appeal judge reviewed both, “taking into consideration inputs from relevant stakeholders.”

 

Cybersecurity Bill 

 

A third draft of a single Cybersecurity Bill, sent to the Attorney General in October 2026 and expected by Government to become law in early 2027, would create a Cybersecurity Authority with powers to make rules for compulsory audits, the reporting of attacks and enforced remediation. 

Almost everything the Deputy Minister described was activity or intention, from tests run and alerts sent to letters issued and a Bill drafted. He said nothing about results, including how many of the 156 institutions had repaired their websites, how many of the 112 had acted on their warnings, or whether any system had already been compromised.

My own findings from last month describe a very different situation, starting with the PHP flaws – nicknamed PHP2Shell and made public on 21 October – that let anyone without a password take control of the server behind a website. While the South African Presidency, the Finnish Government and the UK Government took websites offline within days, between 22 and 24 October I found 80 Sri Lankan State websites running the vulnerable software, 61 of them on versions so old that their developers stopped issuing security patches for them years ago. The Ceylon Electricity Board runs a version from 2013 – and shows anyone who looks a page detailing exactly how its server is configured – as does the Disaster Management Centre, whose database login page is open to the internet, while Ministry of Health staff systems run one older still, from 2010. 

On 24 October I wrote about this utterly untenable situation to the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, and on 26 October, with a far more detailed, technical report, to GovTech and SL-CERT. The Deputy Minister’s figure of 156 institutions, nearly double my 80, supports what I said then, since sites that hide their software version could not be counted from outside. Whatever notices went out clearly did not lead to repairs everywhere, as e-Thaksalawa, the national learning platform for students and teachers, made plain by still running the vulnerable PHP version nearly two weeks after the fix was released. The individual who studied this, and wrote to me, was, incredibly, a Grade 8 student from Mannar, and not GovTech or SL-CERT. This student had, by the time he emailed me, already written to Government entities about these major risks, but heard nothing back. By the Deputy Minister’s own admission, three in every four monitored organisations received at least one warning this year, while only 17 of the 37 critical institutions told by the Cabinet to join the monitoring centre by 31 December have done so, which says a great deal about how widespread the neglect is.

The official circular hands the work of remediation back to the institutions whose neglect created the problem, declaring that “the responsibility for addressing and remediating the identified security exposures rests with the respective Government organisations.” Over 80 critical websites that are totally open for cyber-attacks is, in effect, a regrettable record of how they discharged it. Many of these organisations have no technical staff of their own, depend on outside companies whose contracts ended when the website went live, and have no money set aside for upkeep. As described in Parliament, the circular sets no deadline, asks for no report back, names no official to answer for each system and carries no consequence for being ignored. 

To wit, in 2023, ransomware destroyed 3 months of Government email on servers whose upgrade had been put off since 2021, because it was nobody’s priority, nobody’s budget line, and nobody’s responsibility. My briefs to the PM, GovTech, and SL-CERT therefore asked for a single register of every state system with a named official accountable for each, a binding rule that State bodies run only software that still receives security patches, the legal power to compel patching, and a public list of the institutions notified and how far each has got.

Clearly, this is not where we are at.

MP Weeraratne’s submissions to parliament raised another very serious issue. Whatever significant systemic problems the promised cybersecurity law may address, what troubles me much more is the secrecy of its making, since nobody I know has seen the third draft, which also isn’t in the public domain. Parliament was not told who the “relevant stakeholders” were or how the question of civilian or military control was settled, though the Deputy Minister’s remark that cybersecurity can pose national security threats suggests the defence establishment remains part of it. The last public version, from July 2023, put the authority’s chair and members under the President, who could remove them, gave the head of a Defence Cyber Command a seat on its board and absorbed SL-CERT, so that an organisation reporting an attack would be reporting to a body that could also investigate it. Officials could search premises and copy records without a warrant whenever the authority itself decided a matter was urgent, including for “the effective functioning of the Government”, with a magistrate’s approval sought only within 3 days. The authority could also order internet providers to remove programs from subscribers’ own computers without consent or court oversight, and anyone offering cybersecurity advice would have needed its approval, a rule that could plausibly negatively, and severely impact the kind of independent security research that found the 80 websites, and the flaw on e-Thaksalawa.

 

Short window

 

Given the awful precedent of the Online Safety Act, the first time citizens will read the third draft, and learn whether it keeps any of this, is when it’s gazetted, which leaves only a very short window to challenge it in the Supreme Court. There’s no debate around the fact that Sri Lanka needs a cybersecurity law, and an authority able to make institutions fix what they are told to fix. However, a law drafted out of public sight risks handing the State new powers over citizens’ premises, programs and professions while leaving its own neglect unchecked. Warnings sent are not websites fixed, any more than a Bill nobody outside the Government has read can claim public consent.

 Until the State publishes both the third draft and the list of institutions that have fixed their websites, citizens have no way of judging either the problem or the proposed cure.

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