A troubling shift in university governance

If the Government intends to act in the national interest, it must engage in meaningful consultation with academics, administrators, and university communities, address structural challenges genuinely affecting the sector and safeguard the autonomy that remains the lifeblood of academic excellence

• Why the proposed Universities Bill raises more questions than answers (Amendment to Section 49 of the Universities Act, No. 16 of 1978) 

SRI Lanka’s modern higher education landscape rests on a deep social commitment established nearly a century ago. The transformative reforms led by Dr. C. W. W. Kannangara in the 1940s made free education a cornerstone of national development. As scholars such as Jayaweera (1969), Little (2010), and Fernando (2017) have shown, this investment produced one of the most literate populations in the developing world and laid the foundation for university education to emerge as a public good rather than a privilege. 

When the University of Ceylon was established, and later when the Universities Act of 1978 formalised the system, academic freedom and institutional autonomy were embraced as indispensable principles. For decades, autonomy protected universities from political turbulence, ensured that academic affairs remained internally regulated, and upheld quality standards. Yet by the late 20th century, research by Seneviratne (1999), Wickramasinghe (2014), and others had already begun documenting the gradual erosion of that independence due to politicised appointments, expanding bureaucratic controls, and shifting political priorities.

Globally, the trend has moved in the opposite direction. Leading systems in the UK, Australia, Canada, and across Europe preserve a strong boundary between Government authority and internal academic governance. While national policy and funding remain State responsibilities, decisions about deans, heads of departments, and the organisation of academic units are overwhelmingly internal and merit based. Sri Lanka’s proposed amendment, however, signals a sharp deviation from these norms.  Against this historical backdrop, the newly gazetted Universities (Amendment) Bill has reignited anxieties about the future of autonomy in the Sri Lankan university system. 

What the amendment changes 

1. Deans (Section 49) 

• Eligibility widened to senior professors, professors, associate professors, and senior lecturers (Grade I). 
• A dean elected from among heads of departments must relinquish that post. 
• A dean may serve a maximum of two three-year terms. 
• University councils, bodies often dominated by political appointees, are       explicitly empowered to remove deans at any time. 
• No criteria for removal are defined. 

2. Heads of Department (Section 51) 

• Appointed by the Council on the recommendation of the vice-chancellor.
• Selection must follow a rigid hierarchy: senior professor → professor → associate professor →senior lecturer (Grade I/II). 
• Appointees must be confirmed in their substantive posts and consent to appointment. 
• If no eligible academic exists, a candidate may be appointed from a related discipline. 
• Councils may remove heads of departments without specifying any grounds.
• Term limits set at one term per department, with a second term only if no other eligible academic is available. 
• In effect, the most sensitive academic appointments are placed under bodies already shaped by political influence. 

There is growing concern that the amendment may have been shaped by individuals with close political connections or personal interests in restructuring faculty level powers

Why these changes are deeply concerning 

The proposal is not objectionable simply because it introduces reform. Higher education undoubtedly requires thoughtful restructuring. What is troubling is what the amendment chooses to regulate, and what it conspicuously ignores. 

The Bill devotes extraordinary attention to faculty level appointments (deans and heads of departments), while leaving untouched the positions that have historically been most vulnerable to political interference: 

• Vice-chancellors 
• the UGC chair and Commission members
• University Council members and 
• Directors of institutes. 

This selective focus raises a fundamental question: If political interference has traditionally entered through top level appointments, why impose heightened controls only at the level of faculty governance, one of the few spaces where academic independence has survived. 

A reform disconnected from actual problems 

Sri Lanka’s universities face numerous urgent structural challenges, none of which relate to the appointment of deans or heads of departments. Chronic underfunding, declining education expenditure relative to GDP, prolonged academic and non-academic vacancies, heavy taxation burdens on academics, salary anomalies, and worsening student hardship collectively place the sector under severe strain. 

Adding to this is an administrative irony repeatedly highlighted in auditor-general reports: the Ministry of Education regularly fails to utilise its allocated budget, returning unspent funds to the Treasury while universities struggle with severe shortages. Against such realities, the amendment’s priorities appear strangely misplaced. There is no historical, empirical, or anecdotal evidence that faculty level appointments have created a governance crisis requiring legislative intervention. 

Leading systems in the UK, Australia, Canada, and across Europe preserve a strong boundary between Government authority and internal academic governance. Sri Lanka’s proposed amendment, however, signals a sharp deviation from these norms  

Inconsistencies and selective restrictions 

The Bill imposes strict term limits—two terms for deans and only one for heads of departments. Yet the far more powerful roles of vice-chancellor, UGC chair, or other politically influenced appointments carry no comparable restrictions. Even elected political leaders face no such constraints. 

These inconsistencies fuel speculation that cautious limits are being applied only where academic culture is directly shaped, within faculties and departments. 

Equally puzzling is the exclusion of chair professors, the most senior academics, from the amendment’s eligibility hierarchy. If the intention is to uphold merit and seniority, why omit the very individuals who embody the highest scholarly standing? 

International comparisons 

In advanced higher education systems, from the UK and the Netherlands to Germany and Canada, internal academic governance is protected from political influence. Appointments of deans and heads of departments typically rest on: 

• scholarly reputation, 
• peer confidence, 
• disciplinary leadership and 
• transparent internal selection mechanisms. 

Even in state regulated systems such as France or South Korea, governments seldom interfere in micro level academic appointments. The proposed Sri Lankan model stands in stark contrast, centralising authority in councils whose composition can itself be politically shaped. 

A warning sign: The case of Rajarata University 

The ongoing failure to appoint a vice-chancellor to the Rajarata University of Sri Lanka has caused significant unrest. Many observers attribute the delay to political interference. This administrative paralysis which affects academic planning, student welfare, and institutional stability, illustrates the dangers of politicised governance.  Rather than addressing such systemic vulnerabilities, the new Bill threatens to entrench them further. 

Influence and internal lobbying 

There is growing concern that the amendment may have been shaped by individuals with close political connections or personal interests in restructuring faculty level powers. If lobbying or internal pressures guided its formulation, the implications for autonomy and academic integrity are serious. Embedding politically sensitive appointment mechanisms into the internal structures of universities risks undermining both continuity and independence. 

Sri Lanka’s universities have long suffered from political intrusion from council appointments to contested vice-chancellor selections. The proposed Bill does not remedy this; it compounds it. 

Meaningful reform is indeed necessary. But genuine reform should strengthen, not weaken, academic governance

What the sector needs 

Meaningful reform is indeed necessary. But genuine reform should strengthen, not weaken, academic governance. Sri Lanka’s universities urgently require: 

• increased funding and strategic budget utilisation 
• transparent and timely recruitment 
• improved student welfare 
• modernised physical and digital infrastructure
• policies to retain academic talent and counter brain drain, and 
• robust safeguards for academic freedom and institutional autonomy. 

None of these priorities are addressed in the proposed amendment. 

Instead, the Bill appears oriented toward consolidation of control rather than improvement of governance. If enacted in its current form, it risks suffocating the autonomy that has long enabled Sri Lanka’s universities to produce globally respected graduates and scholarship. 

A call for genuine engagement 

If the Government intends to act in the national interest, it must: 

• engage in meaningful consultation with academics, administrators, and university communities 
• address structural challenges genuinely affecting the sector and
• safeguard the autonomy that remains the lifeblood of academic excellence. 

Until such steps are taken, the proposed amendment represents a troubling shift in governance and one that raises more questions than answers. 

(The author is a Sri Lankan academic and educational leader serving as Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Peradeniya. He holds several academic qualifications including a Doctor of Education (UK), MPhil in Education (University of Colombo), MEd in Education (University of Sussex, UK), PGDE, and a B.A. (Hons.) from the University of Peradeniya)