Fukushima heats the Palk Strait

By Professor Willie Mendis

 

India-Sri Lanka neighbourliness

What makes neighbours India and Sri Lanka special in the global community of nations? One is the huge contrast in their land mass and population. Another is the spirit of good neighbourliness with no malice at each other during its post-independent history; despite a few hiccups inevitable between close neighbours.

The third is their shoulder-to-shoulder proximity separated only by a 26-mile shallow waterway, the Palk Strait, in an otherwise geological continuum. The fourth being Sri Lanka’s acknowledgement that while others are friends, India is a relative.

In such a context, a noteworthy observation is what could be the outcomes when their economies have similarities in terms of growth rates, but in reality one is poised to leap as the world’s third largest economy. Hence, when the small island nation too is developing on its own to be the “Wonder of Asia,” its comfort level is being derailed by a widening range of issues which lie simmering without an adequate safety net between the two. The latter has prompted senior Indian diplomats to coin the mantra that, “Sri Lanka should see India as an Opportunity and not as a Threat”. The perception in same has re-set the focus on the shallow waterway separating the two.

The earliest concerns of what happened on the waterway were merely an irritant for governance. These were issues of smuggling and illicit immigration across this largely unpoliced calm waterbody. Over time these however rose up the agenda of bi-lateral discussions at the highest level. It outcome was the Agreement in 1974 about Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over Kachchativu islet, followed by another Agreement in 1976 delineating the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) across the Palk Strait.

The Kachchativu issue has since been a “hot spot” in the on-going dialogue between the two countries. Another has been the daily crossing of the IMBL by hundreds of Indian fishermen to poach in Lankan waters by claiming that in the water they could only see fish and not boundary lines. Its fall-out today has become a complex socio-political issue for the fishermen of northern Sri Lanka and southern India. It too has become a “hot spot” in the on-going dialogue across the Palk Strait.

Meanwhile, in 2005, India unilaterally decided to create a navigable canal, the Sethu Samudram Canal, by dredging parts of the Palk Strait on its side of the IMBL. The detrimental impact from same on the marine eco-system caused a furore not only on both sides of the waterway, but also internationally. Such protests were compounded by its proponents bulldozing the procedures involved in India to sanction Projects of this nature.

Sri Lanka’s own concerns peaked with its Cabinet of Ministers appointing a high-powered Inter-Ministerial Committee to examine and report on the implications for Sri Lanka. In addition, the issue became an item that was discussed at bi-lateral talks between the leaders of the two countries. It was also debated in Sri Lanka’s Parliament whereat the then Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar informed the country that:

“In any such situation as the Sethu Canal Project, the normal course of action between friendly countries would be to consult and cooperate in order to address common concerns and trans-boundary effects... In such a context, the sum effect of Sri Lanka’s initiative has been to build up a mechanism for exchange of information and to work out modalities to address the concerns in a manner that can command the confidence of all stakeholders. This is based on well recognised principles of International Law relating to the duty to have due regard to the rights of other States and to ensure that activities under the jurisdiction or control of a State are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment.

“These obligations form the cornerstone of principles of good neighbourly and friendly relations and cooperation among States and are clearly reflected in international conventions. There are also provisions in these conventions providing for recourse to related legal fora to discuss and make determinations on such matters... This is obviously a measure of last resort in the event of a failure to resolve any issue through bilateral consultations and friendly cooperation. I am of course duty bound to assure t  he House that Sri Lanka will take all the necessary steps to safeguard the well-being and the interests of our people and our country. We would naturally do this in a calibrated and graduated manner opting first for a co-operative and consultative approach. At the moment we are engaged in the exercise. We will consider further action thereafter, if and when necessary.”

Meanwhile, the Sethu Canal Project has stalled on the grounds that the dredging would damage the Rama Sethu Bridge (or Adam’s Bridge) in the Palk Strait thereby harming the religious beliefs of millions of Hindus. It was an embarrassing reversal of the stand taken by India’s Union Government in its response to the filing of an objection by the Opposition in the highest Court. Its fate will now be decided only after a thorough Environmental Impact Assessment study is completed. Be that as it may, the Sethu Canal Project comprises another hot issue prevailing across the Palk Strait.

Indo-Lanka spatial connectivity for economic integration

It is in the aforementioned backdrop that Sri Lanka has been proactively pursuing connectivity with India across the Palk Strait. In the year 2000 it operationalised the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. In 2002, Sri Lanka proposed to India the construction of a road-rail bridge across the Palk Strait. Its object was the creation of a South India-Sri Lanka economic sub-region, wherein trade between, these two would be much more cost effective.

In its proposal Sri Lanka envisaged a road running south to Colombo from Talaimannar and on to the new proposed port on the southernmost tip, of the island. That in itself would capture new trade, which in turn, “will create new opportunities for business on both sides of the Palk Strait as the road extends up to Bangalore, Chennai and ultimately Mumbai.”

Nonetheless, the conflict which then prevailed in north-east Sri Lanka, prompted the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu State to address a letter to the Indian Prime Minister indicating that, “the land bridge project be viewed not as one of economic cooperation between the two countries but as a vital issue concerning the security of Tamil Nadu and of India”.

Its outcome was the project being dispatched to the backwoods. However, at the meeting of the South Asian Transport Ministers held in July 2009, (after the defeat of the LTTE), the land bridge project was again proposed by Sri Lanka. It now foresaw the road-rail connectivity to India as “the linkage to the Trans Asian Highway and the Trans Asian Railway” which was a UN-ESCAP initiated programme that had been ratified by both India and Sri Lanka. This link agreement had also been signed by 18 countries with access to 27 countries in all.

Meanwhile, in 2003, India’s Union Cabinet “approved the operation of daily air services to and from Sri Lanka to six metros — Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad — apart from the 18 tourist destinations which have been proposed”. In 2003, an MOU was also signed between BSNL the largest public sector telecom undertaking of India and Sri Lanka Telecom, to restore the microwave radio connectivity link between Rameswaram and Talaimannar. One year later in 2004, VSNL of India’s TATA Group, which is India’s leading provider of international telecommunication services and India’s No: 1 provider of internet services, commenced operation in Sri Lanka. These have reinforced digital connectivity across the Palk Strait.

In 2008, a proposal was ratified between India and Sri Lanka which aimed at electric-power connectivity between them by laying an undersea power line. Its pre-feasibility report followed up by a full-feasibility study was undertaken by the Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd (PGIL). Its Sri Lanka counterpart the Ceylon Electricity Board will be inking an MOU for this 285 kilometer power-link, including a submarine cable under the Gulf of Mannar a stretch of 50 kilometers between Rameshwaram and Talaimannar.

Last year (in December 2010), India’s Union Cabinet approved the revival of the ferry services between India and Sri Lanka. It would initially provide connectivity between Tuticorin and Colombo and subsequently between Rameshwaram and Talaimannar. Its MOU was signed by Sri Lanka and India in January 2011. This connectivity service is expected to commence in a few months, “carrying around 500 passengers at a time in each ship provided by each country reaching either destination thrice a week”.

Marine connectivity between India and Sri Lanka by commercial cargo laden ships has increased exponentially in volume between the seaports of the two countries. In this connection, the strategic location of the Colombo Port in the sea-route of the mainline ships between the east and west of the world has favoured its role as a hub-port for the southern sub-continental region.

Consequently, feeder cargo from the Indian sub-continent has risen to about 70% of the containerised cargo handled by Colombo Port. Its relative efficiency and productivity vis-à-vis the Indian Ports (with the possible exception of the Nava Shiva Port), have been an added insurance for its sustenance as a hub-port.

The aforementioned factors indicate that the trend towards increased connectivity between India and Sri Lanka is likely to continue on many other fronts. It has therefore been the focus of several Sri Lankan researchers and analysts in academia and elsewhere to project various scenarios of connectivity between the two countries.

One research study in 2000 had conceived a “transnational spatial strategy” factoring in the key urban nodes and transport corridors which are likely to emerge in Sri Lanka as outcomes of connectivity. Its spatial configuration offers a scenario for promoting bilateral economic integration with its centrepiece being the Indo-Lanka Land Bridge. The latter has been based on the prospective gains to be made in Trade, Tourism and Services. Another, academic paper has analysed the “Economic aspects of transport connectivity between India and Sri Lanka”. It has argued that such connectivity can have two approaches as follows;

i.bridging the two countries with appropriate infrastructure, i.e. road/rail bridge; or

ii.trade improvement disregarding physical connectivity, i.e. trade facilitation through efficient port and shipping services, easing customs procedures, relaxing impediments on labour mobility and participation in multi-country consolidation.

The paper has submitted that (i) above can complement the Trans Asian Highway by being supportive of the national development plans of its connected group of countries which will result in tangible benefits to the people in raising their living standards through the generation of employment.

A further Article appearing on Lanka Business Online (or LBO.lk) datelined 31 October 2010, presented a lucid argument for “India-Sri Lanka physical connectivity and transport”. It submitted that, “improved connectivity is an essential precondition for trade in goods and services, hopefully better governed once the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and Sri Lanka is completed and signed.”

The rationale for the latter has been set out in the Article as follows: The success of the CEPA demands that early and urgent attention be paid to increasing the capacity, variety, and cost-effectiveness of all modes of travel and transport between the two countries with the participation of multiple providers.

In these circumstances it would appear that the stage is gradually firming for physical connectivity between India and Sri Lanka which will not only bring about mutually beneficial outcomes, it will also charter a new paradigm for the future relations of both. The coming years will shape the beacon for mutual trust and confidence at all layers of the two societies, more fully between their political and bureaucratic stakeholders. The cornerstone for same will be the increase in people-to-people connectivity arising from the restoration of multi-modal and lower-cost options.

Fukushima ripples across the Palk Strait

It is in the backdrop of the aforementioned environment that the entire world was compelled to step back aghast at what happened on 11 March 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. Sri Lanka was no exception, wherein the people at-large began to become more aware of the dangers related to nuclear energy accidents.

On the other hand, the direction of vulnerability from Fukushima being away from Sri Lanka, shifted the focus to the potential threats from nuclear power plants at its doorstep. The outcome was the media-hype highlighting the build-up of nuclear plants across the Palk Strait in South India and beyond. It has created a much larger reaction from the public than what happened a decade earlier when the media drew attention on same.

At that time in 2001, the Government of India had finally approved the project after reviewing it for several years, to build the atomic power plant in the southern tip of Tamil Nadu in Koodankulam around 50 kms off the Gulf of Mannar. Its concerns to the scientists in India had been on the protection of the marine ecology.

On the other hand, the local media quoted a prominent Sri Lankan environmentalist having stated that “no 100% security could be ensured with an atomic power plant and warned of serious consequence in case of a mishap”. It further quoted the Director of the Department of Nuclear Science, University of Colombo, stating that “we have the risk and not the benefit and all we can do is to strengthen the protection aspects”.

These cautionary reports were even supplemented in the media with the contrast of what had actually happened due to the already operational Madras Atomic Power Plant at Kalpakam. The discharge of its reactor water had resulted in the sea water temperature rising from 85 to 140 degrees Fahrenheit. Its downside had been that, “the fishermen on the Kalpakam coast were able to catch only dead fish, and that radiation from the nuclear waste discharge has already damaged the health of the people and the environment at Kalpakam coast”.

A year later, in 2002, the local media reported that a Sri Lankan environmental group had written to our then Prime Minister “requesting the appointment of a Commission to assess the impact of the nuclear plant on Sri Lanka”. The latter probably fell on deaf years as no record of such an outcome exists. It could have provided a useful benchmark for subsequent add-ons on matters of protective measures for Sri Lanka.

In this connection the media did however report that the then Chairman of Sri Lanka’s Atomic Energy Authority had placed the entire burden of safety at the Indian nuclear power plants on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He had emphasised that the “Indian authorities will have to adhere to the IAEA safety guidelines in operating the plant”. He had further stated that regarding nuclear waste disposal, “we certainly expect the Indian authorities to follow the safety measures to the accepted standards and that it would not be a threat to the natural environment of neighbouring countries.”

In retrospect, the exclusive reliance for safety on the IAEA safety guidelines may sound somewhat naïve. In fact, it was reported that the IAEA Report on “safety of Nuclear Reactors” issued in 1996, listed 66 accidents in 59 countries.

Furthermore, in a media article published in 2004, Justice C.G. Weeramantry an eminent authority on matters related to the legal aspects of nuclear applications stated: “From the point of view of international law and regulations the situation is fraught with great difficulty, for the International Atomic Energy Agency has no enforcement powers. International standards may be carefully thought out and formulated but they have no binding force. The IAEA has very limited powers to send out safety inspectors. In fact, the main problem is that the IAEA does not have a hold on standards in India.”

In 2004, the media erupted again on the Koodankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. It reported that “Indian officials (requesting anonymity) said the plant would come up after having secured stringent security measures and that possible dangers to either Southern Tamil Nadu, Kerala or Sri Lanka would be a near impossibility”.

This confirms the previously mentioned comment of the Sri Lankan environmentalist that 100% security could not be ensured with an atomic power plant. On the other hand, the lack of transparency due to the concerned public not having access to its (a) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), (b) the Site Evaluation Study and (c) the Safety Analysis Report, had eroded their confidence in the due process. Sri Lanka had a similar experience with India over the EIA Report prepared by NEERI for the Sethu Canal Project. Its sharing came only after much pressure at high Governmental level.

The 2004 media-hype included an explicit warning on the nuclear threat to Sri Lanka from across the Palk Strait. It seems a pre-cursor to a similar statement made seven years later by Sri Lanka’s current Minister of Power and Energy. He was quoted in a media interview datelined 21 March 2011 that, “there is a massive nuclear plant in India. If anything happens to that then we will be affected. We are already under nuclear threat”.

On the other hand, Justice C.G. Weeramantry lamented then, that, “there has been insufficient public awareness of this danger at our doorstep”. The Justice claimed that, “the Kalpakkam installation had leaks in 1988, 1991 and 1997. This plant which is only 98km away from us, was temporarily closed down following the high level of radiation exposure suffered by three staff members on 21 June 2003.”

He further stated that, “According to the Deccan Herald of 6 August 2004, six personnel who inspected the tanks on 21 January 2003, did not carry the necessary safety gadgets and therefore were exposed to radiation when they found a leakage in one of the tanks. As a result, the plant was immediately shut down. The official excuse on same had been that the incident was an isolated case, caused by an error in technical judgment and failure of equipment going unnoticed”.

Nonetheless, Justice Weeramantry argued in the media, “both Indian and Sri Lanka citizens are entitled to know such facts as how much radioactive water escaped to the environment”. It is therefore pertinent to note that although at present the authorities in Sri Lanka are verifying radiation levels arising from the Fukushima accident there was none reported when the leaks occurred across the Palk Strait.

The good news however is that Sri Lankan public is now being provided with whatever information on the accident in Japan; although the under-resourced Atomic Energy Authority should receive more equipment due to the increased public consciousness of the danger at our doorstep.

Importance of India-Sri Lanka negotiations on nuclear safety

The aforesaid article of Justice Weeramantry had advisory prescriptions for the Government “on the importance of entering into friendly negotiations to take such precautions as are necessary to ensure the safety of the people of this country”. He had submitted that, “major principles of customary international law are involved in this, and it is best that the public and the administration be alerted for the need to take stock of this situation and to set in place the necessary precautions and protective measures.” In this connection, he described more fully the conventions in international law as follows:

“No State has a right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause environmental injury in or to a territory of another or to properties therein when the case is of serious consequence and the injuries established by clear and convincing evidence.”

The above was very similar to what the late Foreign Minister Kadirgamar informed Parliament in 2005 when it debated the matters related to the Sethu Canal Project. As mentioned previously herein, Sri Lanka’s approach in that instance was in line with the prescription offered by Justice Weeramantry. Its first step was to take stock of the situation by building a mechanism for exchange of information, and jointly with India to assess the risks through a common base of information. Thereafter, to work out the modalities to address the concerns in a manner that can command the confidence of all stakeholders.

The late Kadirgamar had added that the obligation of good neighbourly and friendly relations was to do this in a calibrated and graduated manner. In this context, Justice Weeramantry had ventured to suggest that the modality on the safety of nuclear power plants should include a request to India for “safety monitors from Sri Lanka be among the monitoring staff employed at these plants”.

He had further opined that Sri Lanka should also request “the right to be kept informed immediately of any untoward incident or faulty procedure that has been observed”. The latter may have been prompted by the proven track record of Governments and private companies who own and operate nuclear power plants of the slowness in releasing information. Inadequate warning time could be fatal to Sri Lanka, claimed Justice Weeramantry. The nuclear radiation from India could easily sweep southwards towards the north-western and western coasts of the island affecting fisheries, crops, dairy and public health among other things.

On the matter of safety at nuclear power plants, experts have conceded that if a leakage could happen in a technologically advanced country such as Japan, it could occur in India as well. Accordingly, one of the key issues in nuclear safety has been the estimation of the level of risk from nuclear reactors. While the critics have always pointed to the enormity of the consequences, those in favour have pointed that the probability of such accidents is extremely small. Nonetheless, however small, it may still occur.

It is for such reasoning that Sri Lanka should urge India to carry out a thorough review of its nuclear safety with independent scientific and technical expertise drawn from outside its nuclear energy establishment. It is pertinent to note that an Indian who has held high-level public office, Gopalakrishnan Gandhi, has joined others including Professor Romila Thapar, to also endorse an independent and transparent safety audit of India’s nuclear energy facilities. The basic premise of this being that the public-at-large should be convinced of its safety in the future. In its absence, Sri Lanka will be compelled to, “batten down the hatches and keep its fingers crossed like good neighbours of a big country”, as was prescribed in a local media editorial, datelined 16 March 2011.

The Fukushima tragedy has certainly raised the heat across the Palk Strait. Its temperature is bound to further rise in the years to come. The Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission has stated that, “theoretically India should set up 40,000 MW reactors by 2020 to meet its energy requirements and become energy independent by 2050”. In fact, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL), the government-run operator of the nuclear plants is engaged in increasing the country’s nuclear energy capacity to 63,000 MW by 2032. This is a huge jump from its presently installed capacity of 4780 MW from 20 operational reactors.

Meanwhile, India’s Minister for Environment has also confirmed that “the country cannot give up on nuclear energy”. Accordingly, its proper perspective for Sri Lanka is crucial as economic integration by connectivity with India is becoming more real than ever before. Consequently, the factoring in of the safety of the nuclear power plants in the larger picture of bi-lateral co-operation is essential for the protection of the beneficiaries of connectivity.

In Sri Lanka’s own future plans for nuclear energy, it is fundamental to resolve whether it is an option, “even if all our other options fail”. To suggest that, “limitations of fossil fuel compel countries to go in for nuclear power for their base load energy needs”, is signalling of its inevitability. Nonetheless, the estimated period of 15 years for the dawn of the choice for launching nuclear energy in Sri Lanka, further pressurises engagement in protective measures for potential threats across the Palk Strait in the intervening period.

Even the prospect of having a lesser risk by using Thorium technology with assistance from India has raised concerns in a local media editorial datelined 5 September 2009. It has implied that India’s offer to transfer its technology of enriching Thorium to Uranium, underlies a motive to access the deposits in the coastlines of Negombo and Beruwala.

The validation of same is inferred in the statement which appeared in The Hindu of 6 February 2009, made by the Chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, that “even after the most optimum use of energy resources including Thorium and Uranium reserves we will face an energy deficit of 400 giga-watts by 2050”. The access to these resources available elsewhere is therefore inherently an alternative for India.

The preparedness for the impact of a nuclear energy disaster in Sri Lanka by way of friendly bi-lateral co-operation across the Palk Strait, could be pursued on a graduated and calibrated process as was done for the Sethu Canal project. The, Sri Lanka Disaster Management Centre (DMC), can be the National Focal Agency for the exchange of information, and for the right to be informed immediately of an accident in a nuclear power plant. It is mandated with the task of preparing for a nuclear disaster as per its Act No: 13 of 2005.

It can partner with other key institutions such as the Atomic Energy Authority, Meteorology Department and the Universities, to strengthen its own resources. The Ministry of External Affairs can be the pivot around which the logistics and protocols of bi-lateral Agreements, MOUs, and high-level meetings will be arranged. It is a wake-up-call for them to avoid what happened on the Sethu Canal saga wherein the Government was clearly in the dark until the media-hype evoked a response. The rest is now history.

Nuclear accident preparedness

In preparing itself, the DMC must learn from the ground realites at the places which have had nuclear accidents of varying scales. One example can be that of the Three Mile Island disaster in central Pennsylvania, USA. It happened almost 32 years ago, and offers how the town has since prepared itself to face a potential crisis that may arise from the repaired power plant which continues to operate to date.

In the immediate aftermath of the accident, “pregnant women and small children were ordered to evacuate, while the decision to leave was voluntary for everyone else”. In the subsequent post-disaster recovery years, “the Local borough (Local Council) maintains a disaster room lined with evacuation route maps that are updated to reflect every road repair. Further, the residents stock potassium iodide pills.

A local citizens group maintains a network of 30 radiation monitors and keeps in touch with the appointed Co-ordinator of the nuclear plant. The group also stocks 30,000 doses of potassium iodide. The plant too routinely tests its emergency plans, which includes a full-scale exercise of testing its sirens and the activation of emergency centres. The local phone book publishes the evacuation routes, and offers a primer on nuclear fission, and also a map with a 10-mile radius drawn around the plant”.

In these circumstances, the Three Mile Island residents now claim “the fear comes from not having a plan when something happens for what to do, where to go, what the sirens means. Now we know”.

The situation across the Palk Strait will need to be studied by the DMC when bi-lateral cooperation has been negotiated. The good news after the Fukushima accident is the acknowledgment by the NPCIL that although Indian nuclear plants have remained safe during two natural calamities in the last decade, there was no room for complacency”. Further, India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board too announced on 15 March 2011, that” it would carry out a comprehensive re-assessment of safety and emergency mitigation measures at all the Indian nuclear power plants, in the light of the crisis in Japan”.

Be that as it may, it is pertinent to note from the Newspaper Article by Dr. Janaka Ratnasiri on 16 March 2011 that there had been a shutdown of the Tamil Nadu coastline reactor when the Tsunami struck in December 2004. Furthermore, a report datelined 14 March 2011 in The Hindu quoted a member of the Kerala State Disaster Management Authority who admitted that, “the possibility of a nuclear accident had not been factored into the State’s disaster management plan. She added that “the hospitals were not yet fully equipped for mass casualty management in case of a radiation leak at Koodankulam. We have no contingency plan in place. Officials have also admitted that even basic measures like facilities for decontamination and mass administration of iodine were lacking.”

This is a situation which Sri Lanka’s DMC must overcome by preparing the on-going training of its Emergency Response Team for Chemical and Radiological Emergencies in tandem with the Hospitals; especially in the North Western and Western Provinces which have been perceived as likely vulnerable zones in the event of an accident at the Koodankulam and Kalpakkam nuclear power plants.

A worrisome observation that was reported on 5 April 2011 by AFP news network comprised the statement by A. Gopalakrishnan, the former Head of India’s AERB. His submission was that, “the AERB disaster preparedness oversight is mostly on paper and the drills they once in a while conduct are half-hearted efforts which amount more to a sham”. Fuel to the latter was added by the Head of the Indian Institute of Science, P. Balaram. He stated that, “pending the review of its nuclear policy, there should be a moratorium on all further nuclear activity, and the revocation of recent clearances for nuclear projects.”

Concluding remarks

In these circumstances, the Fukushima accident has to be reflected in the bi-lateral agenda of high-level discussions between the leaders of India and Sri Lanka. It cannot be and should not be a fire fighting exercise, where the concerns revert to the backwoods after the fire is doused. Sri Lanka needs to take seriously, the potential threat from across the Palk Strait.

This does not mean that the upward trend for connectivity between the two nations should be derailed. On the contrary, Sri Lanka cannot be reliant solely on its internal momentum for development from within. Its greater prosperity lies in its connectivity for economic integration with India.

The catch-22 in same will be the skill in cooling the heat across the Palk Strait that is straddling several hot issues such as poaching. Kachchativu, Sethu Canal and now nuclear power. It’s time-line may be long as typical of bilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, a beginning must be made by Sri Lanka.

(The writer is former Vice Chancellor and currently Professor Emeritus, University of Moratuwa.)