Indo Lanka fires

Fires started across the Palk Straits during the latest UN Human Rights Council Sessions in Geneva, continue to blaze even a fortnight after the meeting concluded and New Delhi voted in support of a US led resolution on Sri Lanka urging action on post-war reconciliation and investigation of alleged excesses in the final stage of the conflict.

The emotive Tamil Nadu has kept the pressure up on the Indian Central Government passing a resolution in the State Assembly against Sri Lanka about the plight of the Northern Tamils. Meanwhile in an unprecedented move last week, the State decided it will not host Indian Premier League games involving Sri Lankan players, creating a storm of controversy on both sides of the Palk Straits.

The application of profound international theory to the study of a state’s foreign policy, as it relates to geo-politics and the delicate interplay between states is both fashionable and academically fulfilling, but in simple terms, for the past 25 centuries, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has been governed by a singular factor; how it handles its relationship with India.

Sometimes the doting big brother, sometimes stern disciplinarian and sometimes overstepping its mark, India is never without a significant role in Sri Lanka’s dealings with the world. Even at times of extreme provocation and with some amount of irritation, successive Governments in Sri Lanka have understood and learned to balance the New Delhi factor, whether it is in the way it executed the war against the LTTE or in terms of how it related to other states in the world.

As Colombo looks ahead, after two successive years in Geneva when the Indian Government has sided with the US and a primarily western lobby to push for accountability and devolution in Sri Lanka, the realisation may need to dawn that the country’s future international engagement largely depends on how effectively it can bring back its relationship with New Delhi from the precipice upon which it stands today.

In these heady days of anti-Indian sentiment and a sense of betrayal about New Delhi’s position on Sri Lanka internationally, it is also important to remember that when the Government decided to push forward with the offensive to militarily crush the LTTE, India’s Congress Government supported the move without constraint. So iron-clad were relations between the ruling administration and its counterpart in New Delhi, that in April 2009, the Sri Lankan troops declared a lull in hostilities in order to avoid agitating India’s south as casualty figures mounted in the embattled North. Yet somewhere down the line, successive promises made and broken resulted in a breakdown of trust between the two states.

Four years since the war ended, New Delhi and the Congress that promised Tamil Nadu a political settlement for Sri Lanka’s Tamil population has come up empty handed. Having promised devolution based on the 13th amendment, Sri Lanka’s political leadership has shown no movement on the issue. The post war phase in Sri Lanka has been riddled with continued problems for the Northern Tamils and New Delhi could no longer ignore calls for pressure on Colombo by March last year. One year later, from New Delhi’s perspective, things have only gotten worse. In the process of refusing to take a stronger line against Colombo, it has lost a key constituent ally in the DMK led by prominent Tamil Nadu politician Karunanidhi. Calls are emanating from all over India, no longer just from its south, for stronger action against Sri Lanka. This week, BJP strongman and former Foreign Minister Yashwant Singh joined the chorus for a separate state if Sri Lanka does not offer devolution to the Tamils, and even claimed India should call for Colombo’s suspension from the Commonwealth.

To win back India, Sri Lanka does not need to do much but holding a free and fair election in the North is a good start, followed by full implementation of the 13th amendment and truly winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil people. India wants healing in Sri Lanka so that it can quell the fires in its own backyard. Unwillingness to compromise in this, could determine whether Colombo’s engagement with the international community going forward will be smooth sailing or stormy seas.