Monday, 11 November 2013 00:00
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TRADE-offs can be dangerous. The absence of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) is now all but certain, paving the way for serious damage to Indo-Lanka relations.
Top of the danger list is the fate of attempts to push Colombo further down the road of power devolution and reconciliation with the Tamil minority as well as India’s ability to counter Sri Lanka’s strong ties with ever-creeping China.
Analysts fear that if Singh capitulates to Tamil Nadu politicians, it will result in irreparable damage to the struggle for political rights launched by the Sri Lankan Tamil community decades ago as well as gains that could be implemented through a Northern Provincial Council that has a strong relationship with the Sri Lankan Government.
In fact at a time when even the Tamil National Alliance moderates want Singh to sing, as it were, at CHOGM and travel to the north to boot, his decision to disregard the offer is sure to singe. But puns aside, many analysts in India question whether Singh’s decision to stay away will win him the coveted South Indian vote and indeed whether this call will negatively affect his legacy after he steps down, which he is largely expected to do after polls.
Most analysts also feel that the Rajapaksa administration holding Northern Provincial Council elections, extending cordial engagement to the TNA, signing on the dotted line of Sampur and engaging on the sensitive fishermen issue are all reason enough for Premier Singh to show diplomatic quid pro quo by attending CHOGM.
Then there is the bigger picture. If the Prime Minister of India is blackmailed by Tamil Nadu into absenting himself from the summit despite the election of the NPC, it is highly probable that the same factor would prevent Delhi from being perceived as favouring Colombo or even sit on the fence at the March 2014 session of the UN Human Rights Council if a resolution to initiate an international inquiry into the conduct of the war by the Sri Lankan State were to come up for a vote. Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka argues additionally that it would be the tipping point that pushes Sri Lanka firmly into the arms of Beijing and Islamabad.
India, already cagey over the ‘string of pearls’ strategy, cannot afford to anger the Sri Lankan administration to the point that it becomes even more firmly entrenched with China. With large-scale projects from highways to high-altitude training facilities funded by China, it is clear that New Delhi already has its work cut out to keep Sri Lanka on its side of the fence.
India’s Foreign Ministry is exercising that most hallowed of diplomatic skills – saying much but committing to nothing – while Colombo is also treading water. Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid has cautioned that Singh’s absence should not be seen in a negative light, but it is unlikely that Sri Lanka will don rose-tinted glasses in this instance.
Engagement is a more pragmatic policy than isolation. Once that final card is played, India may find that it has an empty hand and an un-tethered Sri Lankan Government with a free hand to do as it wishes regarding human rights and power devolution on the other side of the Palk Strait.
