Polarisation and fragmentation

With the defeat of the LTTE, massive cracks began to appear in almost all sectors of the society, not only in party politics but in religious sects as well.

No doubt, the war victory changed the course of Sri Lankan politics and certainly brought about a new chapter in our history. The Mahawamsa, the great chronicle, has now been enlarged to put on record the military triumph over the LTTE.

The JVP too had to undergo rapid changes and a new offshoot emerged recently amidst an abduction scenario. Only the State intelligence and the parties to the incident know what happened behind it as the general populace is struggling to cope up with the ever-increasing cost of living.

The Government was able to consolidate and exploit the victory to its maximum. Pole-vaulting and defections are still in vogue. The public mandate had been diluted and exchanged for perks and other personal benefits, leaving the voter in the lurch. The voter is bemused and amused as to the pathetic situation to which the voter has been relegated.  

The UNP

It is unfortunate that the credible alternative to the Government is the Opposition but it is riddled with factional politics. With two rival leaders at the helm of UNP giving directions to the party, cadres would certainly widen the gulf between the two leaders and manifest the plight of the UNP.

The recent party election was meant to consolidate the UNP and to bring about discipline within the ranks, but instead it brought about a new cold war between the two opposing camps and would further drift the UNP apart, preventing it from being catapulted into an electoral victory.

A credible alternative to the existing system of governance is of course the largest political party in the opposition. It has deep roots in the society, being the single largest party in Sri Lanka. It had maintained its elephant symbol for more than six decades.

It has produced outstanding leaders and has a rich history in post-independence Sri Lanka. The UNP represents the majority and the minorities alike and had the ability to hold a May Day rally in Jaffna, which underscored that pluralism to which the party is bound. The UNP introduced the 1978 Constitution, which caused a massive change in the style of governance, with ugly precedents from within UNP regimes in the past. It pursued economic development during the 1980s and succeeded; it pursued war and failed; it pursued peace and failed, but could have been successful if the peace process was well-managed.

Joint strategy

The one aspect most political parties are currently beset with is the lack of cohesion in their strategies and positioning the party to face elections. This would be a mammoth task as SLFP-led governments have been in power since 1994.

The war victory has galvanised the masses into different camps. This situation requires drastic overhaul of party politics and political management. The Government is ever powerful and it has the State media to manipulate for its own advantage and it has also private media institutions.

Under the current circumstances, political parties would not be able to mount a campaign to withstand the State machinery unless there is a joint strategy. With the fragmentation of parties and with different ideologies, a joint strategy would be an uphill task. It would also be difficult to find a common candidate given the ideological differences.

Political marketing

Political marketing is a subject relatively new to Sri Lanka, though there are competent professionals. Philip Kotler, a renowned marketing guru points out, “Conscious marketing only promises to maximise the candidate’s potential… Applying standard marketing techniques to political campaigning will at least ensure that the campaign’s planning is systematic, efficient, and voter oriented. Marketing can promote the most effective use of scarce resources, generate valuable information for both the candidate and the voters, and promote greater responsiveness in the political process.”

Political parties should also venture into new strategies and techniques of political communications but to implement such strategies would require financial resources. Given the current economic outlook, it would be difficult to garner support from business enterprises.

However, a well-thought-out strategy encompassing all techniques of communications, advertising, membership drives, attractive candidates and policies might be able to change the pattern.

Wickremesinghe and the CFA

President Rajapaksa is now well into his second term of office with a comfortable majority in Parliament. Everybody seems to be pointing the finger at Ranil Wickremesinghe as being responsible for the losses the party has suffered.

One school of thought is of the view that the peace accord it signed with the LTTE was the reason for the decline of the UNP vote base. Wickremesinghe is an experienced politician and in the aftermath of the economic catastrophe unleashed by the President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaranatunga (CBK) Government, the only option available at that moment was for a temporary respite and the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) was the only viable option.

What went wrong with the CFA was the manner in which it was implemented and the Wickremesinghe Government gave ample opportunities for hawkish elements to give vent to their feelings over the State and private media.

The Norwegian Government too should have been cautious in meeting the LTTE’s demands during the CFA. The LTTE was brazenly violating the CFA and Wickremesinghe was helpless not to be on the offensive.

The Rajapaksa administration was so resolute that war must be won and no other opinion was tolerated and eventually the war, which everybody thought was impossible, was brought to a successful conclusion.

No UNP party member had the gall to oppose Wickremesinghe, except for a few, when he signed the CFA. In fact there was a huge public outcry that the peace process should be an ‘inclusive process’ and had he allowed an all party involvement, perhaps he could have bailed himself out from a pathological responsibility over any fallout from the CFA.

Even members of the Opposition (now in Government) did raise concerns that they too should have been involved in the peace process.

But Wickremesinghe went about alone and allowed the hawkish elements to garner support from the Sinhala majority, of course with the usual political rhetoric and propaganda.

(The writer is a freelance journalist and a political lobbying and government relations consultant.)